

USI – SEMINAR

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ESTABLISHED 1870

SECURITY CHALLENGES OF INDIA IN THE REGIONAL CONTEXT WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO TERRORISM-PROGNOSIS AND RESPONSES

PROCEEDINGS OF USI SEMINAR

HELD AT

CHANDIMANDIR

ON

WEDNESDAY, 04 SEPTEMBER 2002

UNITED SERVICE INSTITUTION OF INDIA

Rao Tula Ram Marg, Vasant Vihar
New Delhi-110 057

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Forenoon Session

External Challenges and Responses --

Chairman

General VP Malik, PVSM, AVSM (Retd)

Afternoon Session

Internal Challenges and Responses --

Chairman

Lieutenant General Vijay Oberoi

PVSM, AVSM, VSM (Retd)

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WELCOME ADDRESS

LIEUTENANT GENERAL VIJAY OBEROI, PVSM, AVSM, VSM

Honourable Governor of Punjab, Lieutenant General JFR Jacob; General V P Malik, former Chief of the Army Staff; GOC-in-C Western Command, General Mehta; Member of the USI Council, Lieutenant General R S Dayal; distinguished guests; members of the USI; friends from the Media; Ladies and Gentlemen. It is my privilege this morning to welcome you to this first Seminar of the United Service Institution of India, which is being held outside New Delhi. This Seminar is the outcome of the aspirations of a large number of members of the USI, who have been voicing their desire for the USI to spread its activities outside New Delhi, in order to ensure that the USI members not located in Delhi also benefit by participating in at least some activities of the USI. Although the USI had been mulling over various related proposals for many years, it was only early this year that this issue was pursued in right earnest. The Director of the USI, Lieutenant General Satish Nambiar, was supportive of the proposal, as was the Executive Committee when the proposal was placed before them.

The USI today has a membership of over 7000, spread all over India. While there are nearly 3000 members in the National Capital Region, the next highest concentration of members is in the Chandigarh-Panchkula area. The numbers are nearly 230. The other stations with a large concentration of members are Pune with nearly 200 and Bangalore with over 100. The Executive Committee of the USI approved the holding of the first USI seminar outside New Delhi at Chandigarh. The turnout for the event is ample evidence of the overwhelming support for the organisation of such events.

A very large number of professionals have settled down at Chandigarh and the twin townships of Panchkula and Mohali. These professionals are not only from the Defence Services, but represent practically all fields and disciplines. Collectively, they represent an awesome amount of professional experience in diverse fields, which impacts on practically every endeavour of the nation state and all its citizens. This talent and experience must not atrophy and go to waste. It needs to be harnessed for the good of the nation and the society. The USI can only help up to a point, for, by its very nature, activities of an institution like the USI, outside its permanent location, cannot but be limited in scope and content. The first requirement, therefore, is to establish a Chapter of the USI around Chandigarh, which can act as - to use the army parlance - 'firm base'. This can only come about with the generous support of HQ Western Command, which I have no doubt would be forthcoming. Hopefully, in the long term, we may be able to set up a separate organisation, which can operate in an autonomous mode and independently, in a similar manner as the USI or the India International Centre (IIC), also situated in New Delhi. Such an organisation would be able to bring all the available talent together, and with a focused approach, discuss and debate on issues of concern, and reach definitive conclusions, which may assist decision-makers. I take this opportunity to make an earnest appeal to the State Governments of the Northern region of our country, and particularly the States of Punjab and Haryana, as well as the Union Territory

of Chandigarh, to assist in setting up such an organisation. The organisation may well be called the Northern India Institute of Strategic Studies, or by any other suitable name. Forming such an organisation is not at all difficult, but finding it a home and setting it up can only be done if the state governments of the Northern region assist by allotting land and a generous infusion of funds. I am convinced that we can make it a successful venture, as also one which benefits the state governments concerned, as well as the Nation.

Today, we have come together to discuss a very topical and relevant subject, which concerns various facets of security of our country. We plan to discuss it in two sessions. The session in the forenoon will focus on 'External Challenges and Responses' and that in the afternoon will deal with 'Internal Challenges and Responses'. We have a distinguished set of speakers for both the sessions. I am particularly happy that I have been able to co-opt General V P Malik, former Chief of the Army Staff, as the Chairman of the forenoon session. Another distinguished person, Shri A N Mathur, Chief Secretary of the Government of Haryana, who was chairing the afternoon session, has been unable to be present on account of last minute official commitments. The audience will, therefore, have to bear with me as I chair that Session.

Allow me to make a request to all present, particularly the members of the media, to kindly observe what the British call the Chatham House Rules, namely that while you can report on all aspects of the proceedings of the Seminar, you do not attribute statements, observations or remarks made during the proceedings, specifically to

the individuals who make them. This would make for free, frank and substantive discussion.

On behalf of the USI and all those present here, it is my privilege to welcome Lieutenant General JFR Jacob, the Honourable Governor of Punjab and Administrator of the Union Territory of Chandigarh, to deliver the Inaugural Address.

Lieutenant General Jacob is perhaps the most energetic Governor and Administrator this country has had. Commissioned into the Indian Artillery in June 1942, he has had a 37-years exciting and highly distinguished career in the Indian Army. He was the Chief of Staff of the Eastern Army during the critical period prior to and during the operations for the liberation of Bangladesh in 1971. He was awarded the PVSM for his 'pivotal role' there. He is the author of *Surrender at Dacca- Birth of a Nation*. Prior to assuming the office of Governor of Punjab on 27 November 1999, he was the Governor of Goa for over one and a half years.

During his long and distinguished career in the Army, Lieutenant General Jacob had successfully dealt with a number of insurgency situations, notably the Naxalite Movement in 1969-71, which paved the way for peaceful elections in West Bengal and as the Eastern Army Commander, during the period 1974-75, he effectively dealt with the Naga insurgency, setting the stage for signing the Shillong Accord, which brought peace to the area for the next 12 years. He was also instrumental in bringing the Mizo Underground to the conference table for the first time, at Calcutta. Since the challenge posed by terrorism is a major facet of our discussions

today, we hope he will share some of his thoughts on this important subject with us.

Lieutenant General Jacob has a long association with the USI. Besides being a life member of the Institution, he has been

both a member of the USI Council, as also a member of the Executive Committee of the USI.

May I now request the Honourable Governor to deliver the Inaugural Address.

INAUGURAL ADDRESS

LIEUTENANT GENERAL JFR JACOB, PVSM (RETD)

General V P Malik, Lieutenant General Vijay Oberoi, Lieutenant General SS Mehta, GOC-in-C Western Command, distinguished guests, members of the USI, ladies and gentlemen. I am happy to address you on this occasion, when the United Service Institution is spreading its activities outside New Delhi. The Seminar would hopefully be a catalyst for many such events in future.

The USI, set up in 1870, has played an important role in developing a tradition of serious debate and discussion on the important issues of national security and defence. For various reasons, its activities have been confined to New Delhi. I am glad that this is changing. The selection of Chandigarh for starting outstation activities of the USI is appropriate, as the city is well placed; a large number of professionals from various disciplines have settled down here, as also in the adjoining cities of Panchkula, Mohali and the military station of Chandimandir.

In today's national security, geo-strategic and geo-political environment, the immediate and overriding priorities are that of terrorism and insurgency. My remarks, therefore, are correspondingly weighted. Terrorism and insurgency are not a modern phenomenon. Ancient campaigns never entirely lacked a political consideration, except those that were launched in the interest of booty. In a global context, terrorism and insurgency have evolved into instruments to achieve specific fundamentalist and political goals.

The frustration of governments is understandable, in dealing with terrorism and insurgency as they are unable to employ sophisticated weapons systems in their own countries, due to moral-political considerations, or that they are technically unsuitable for fighting in a particular environment. So long as conventional commanders fail to adapt organisations, techniques and tactics to meet terrorist and insurgent challenges these movements will prosper. Even when properly applied, military force cannot on its own impose a solution. All it can aim at is to force terrorists or insurgents to talk from a position of weakness, to accept a political solution.

Insurgency can be defined as an armed rebellion by a section of the population against the legally constituted Government with the support or sympathy of a proportion of the local population obtained voluntarily, by coercion or aided or sponsored by foreign elements or powers. Insurgency covers the full spectrum of conflict, from subversion, terrorism to full-scale guerrilla war, including the emergence of guerrilla bands into regular units. The international community has so far been unable to arrive at an agreed definition of terrorism. In the Indian context terrorism may be defined as the threat of violence or an act or series of acts of violence, effected through surreptitious means, by an individual, organisation or a group of people, both indigenous and foreign, to further his or their political or communal aims.

In the Indian context, modern terrorism and insurgency are basically communal. Here

the word 'communal' is used in its more catholic sense to include religion, caste, tribe, language and ethnic streams. The only movement in India that is relatively free from communal bias and is mainly politically motivated is that of the Naxalite. Communalism is not new to the Indian scene and since Independence it has spread at an alarming rate. Migration of people, upsetting local balances and economic life, lead to further instability, which communal forces exploit. An instance of this is the migration from Bangladesh into Assam, Tripura, West Bengal and the North East.

Insurgency and terrorism are not new to India. Both movements tend to merge with each other. It is very difficult to decide when a terrorist movement develops into an insurgency. Terrorism has become an arm of developing or ongoing insurgencies. In the post Independence period they both have become transitional and are undermining the unity of the country. In India, insurgency and terrorism are politically, communally or criminally motivated and cover religious, caste, tribal, linguistic and ethnic-motivated movements.

The aim of an insurgent force is to achieve a political objective by military means. It is not unknown for insurgents to achieve a decisive military victory by defeating the security forces in battle. Military success is not, however, essential. Insurgents can still gain their objectives if they can enforce a settlement, wherein the government and the security forces, which are a projection of the government's policy, finally decide that the cost of countering an indecisive struggle is no longer worth while. The insurgent's aim of defeating the government's will to fight is, therefore, achieved.

Terrorism can evolve into insurgency when it takes sufficient hold and is able to broaden its base. An archetype is the Naxalite movement, which evolved from political terrorism to insurgency. Insurgencies such as the Moplah, Hur or recently the Naga, Mizo and the Pak sponsored insurgency in Jammu and Kashmir have used terrorism as an arm of insurgency.

Counter insurgency operations may be divided into two parts - defensive and offensive. Defensive operations are designed to prevent the insurgents from disrupting the Government by protecting installations, communications and, in general, keeping surveillance over the area. Both these are dependent on accurate and timely intelligence, and more importantly, the ability to assess the bits and pieces of information obtained. Proper coordination of the various intelligence agencies is essential. Defensive operations are essential. Else, the insurgents can achieve easy success, particularly on soft targets. Pressure is always there to deploy a large number of troops on static duties. Offensive operations are designed to flush out the hostiles. Ultimately it is only by offensive action that a suitable military environment can be created for political negotiations. In the past, far too much weightage had been given to defensive operations, the emphasis being on the establishment of numerous posts, with the result that there were inadequate mobile forces for conducting offensive operations. Offensive operations call for very high standards of training and physical fitness. They require mobility not only by land but also transport and logistic air support. These parameters make it essential that offensive operations should mainly be carried out by the Army and the Air Force, in order to

counter the Pak sponsored proxy war in Jammu and Kashmir, as also in the North East.

In a conflict there are four main objectives, namely :-

- (a) Destruction of the enemy's armed forces.
- (b) Disruption of the enemy's bases, supply lines and infrastructure.
- (c) Breaking the enemy's morale and will to resist.
- (d) Achieving the overall political aim.

The first two, namely destroying the enemy's main forces and disrupting his bases and lines of supply, are essential for breaking his will to resist. Without this, political aims cannot be achieved. The third factor, that is breaking the enemy's will to resist, is the most important. However, military means alone cannot produce a final solution. They, however, create a suitable environment from which the insurgents will have to talk from a position of weakness and thus become amenable to accepting a political settlement. In the conduct of operations, it is most important that concurrently every effort must be made to win over hearts and minds to ensure a lasting settlement.

Once insurgency and terrorism take root, it is difficult to unmake them; they may be suppressed but they can be readily resurrected. There is no purely political solution on its own, to end insurgency and terrorism; if there were, they would not have taken root. There is no purely military solution either. Militarily, there are two factors which

are required by insurgents to keep an insurgency going, namely firm bases and lines of supply for weapons, equipment and money. Military force has to be employed to disrupt their bases and lines of supply so that the terrorists and insurgents are reduced to a position of weakness and are compelled to accept a political settlement. An illustration of this is the military operations in 1974 and 1975 in Nagaland, encompassing the capture of two gangs going to China to collect weapons, and offensive operations conducted to destroy their bases in Nagaland. It forced the insurgents to the negotiating table and resulted in the signing of the Shillong Accord in November 1975.

There has been a dangerous revival of religious fundamentalism in the country. Extremist groups are fanning communalism. Large sums of foreign money from the Middle East, Pakistan and some western countries have been channelled to various dubious organisations, particularly some of the Madrassas. These, according to their donors, are said to be for social, economic and religious purposes. But much of it is being channelled to fuel terrorism and insurgency.

A brief look at Pakistan's involvement to destabilise India is also relevant. There is a gap between Musharraf's promises and what he has delivered. Cross-border terrorism continues. While domestic compulsions of General Musharraf need to be factored in, they cannot continue to be an excuse for inaction. The religious fundamentalists, both domestic and foreign, who have been allowed to grow and expand by successive Pakistani Governments over the last two to three decades, may not be easy to rein in, especially in a short timeframe. As the

situation is today, Musharraf has been unable to convince us and much of the international community about his sincerity and intentions. There is, therefore, no question of any complacency on our part at this juncture. Pakistan continues to wage a proxy war in Jammu and Kashmir, and through its ISI, it is fostering insurgency and terrorism in the North East. India must have the will to face terrorism and insurgency squarely and firmly in its early stages, before they gain momentum. Encouragement of factions within these movements, for short-term gains, should be avoided.

I have dealt largely with terrorism and insurgency, as these are our immediate and overriding security problems. In the overall long term geo-strategic environment, you may consider the potential threats posed by neighbouring States, particularly China.

The importance of the Bay of Bengal and the Indian Ocean to our sea lanes and economic survival needs serious study. I trust that you will devote some time to evaluate the regional military equations and balances. May I congratulate the USI for organising this Seminar. I wish you a most successful and productive Seminar.

EXTERNAL CHALLENGES AND RESPONSES

FORENOON SESSION

Chairman : **General VP Malik, PVSM, AVSM (Retd)**

First Paper : Air Marshal R S Bedi, AVSM, VM (Retd)

Second Paper : Major General Rajendra Nath, PVSM (Retd)

Third Paper : Brigadier Satish K Issar, VSM (Retd)

Fourth Paper : Shri Kanwar Sandhu

Discussions

GENERAL V P MALIK, PVSM, AVSM (RETD)
CHAIRMAN

First of all I would like to compliment Lieutenant General Vijay Oberoi and Lieutenant R S Dayal, both Council members of the USI and Lieutenant General Mehta, GOC-in-C, Western Command, who has provided support to the USI for organising the Seminar here. This was something that all of us, particularly those residing at Chandigarh, Panchkula and Mohali were looking forward to. I am happy that the efforts, particularly of Lieutenant General Oberoi and Lieutenant General Dayal have borne fruit. We hope that this sort of activity would continue and it will provide the forum that this place and the people residing here deserve. They have contributed immensely in the service of the Nation and the Services, and can do a lot more. What they require is a good forum to express views and discuss national security matters.

We are going to discuss the 'External Challenges and Responses' to the security of India, in the regional context, with special reference to terrorism. Due to globalisation, the distinction between national and international security is getting blurred. Instability in a country or a region adversely affects the peace and development elsewhere. There is an environment of strategic uncertainty, which is applicable more to the countries of Asia and Africa. However, warfare too has moved down the scale of intensity - while conventional warfare has become increasingly unviable due to high costs, high casualty rates and international pressures, sub-conventional conflicts and armed violence have become more prevalent. In the 1990s, over 30 conflicts were listed by SIPRI in different parts of the world, with

most of them originating in Asia. There are many boundary and territorial disputes on this Continent that are yet to be resolved. Internal and external security today is meshed as never before. It may also be noted that in the current strategic environment, wars when they occur may no longer be taken to the logical conclusion of military victories as was done in 1971. They would be conducted with the objective of achieving political successes rather than a complete military victory. Such a total military victory was not achieved by even the US and the multinational forces in the Gulf War or in Kosovo. In the Kargil War, the political aim and term of reference prevented the military from escalating the conflict or crossing the Line of Control.

Over one-third of the total border that we share with our six neighbours is disputed. There are several pockets which are yet to be resolved. We have over 2.01 million sq km of EEZ; and around 7683 kms of coastline. We have over 600 islands, both in the Bay of Bengal and in the Arabian Sea, and very few are inhabited. Therefore, sea lanes are important not only for trade and commerce but also for the protection of island territories that we have. Challenges to national security from terrorism, ethnic diversity, proliferation of small arms, narco-trafficking, and religious extremism still need to be addressed with adequate concern and vigour. In this session, the focus will be on the external and not the internal dimensions. Nuclear deterrence has in recent years acquired an important facet of regional security. The transition of India and Pakistan to nuclear weapon status had, unlike the case when China went nuclear, many misgivings.

Pakistan as also the Western countries have raised the bogey of Kashmir as a nuclear flashpoint and South Asia has now been classified as an unstable region. To some extent this seems to be deliberate and exaggerated.

The panelists shall now present their papers. Air Marshal R S Bedi will present his paper first. He was commissioned in the

Indian Air Force on 1 April 1956. A fighter pilot, he has flown almost every kind of fighter aircraft. He has logged over 4000 hours of flying and has commanded some important Air Force Stations, like the ones at Suratgarh and Halwara. He has held some very important staff appointments, the last and most important being that of Director General Defence Planning Staff, as part of the Chiefs of Staff Committee.

FIRST SESSION : FIRST PAPER**AIR MARSHAL R S BEDI, AVSM, VM (RETD)**

National Security, the prime responsibility of a nation state, transcends the commonly perceived military threat. Any external element or determinant that affects a state's sovereignty or integrity, its well being, or jeopardises its freedom of action, is considered a threat to the nation. These may manifest in the form of military, economic, diplomatic, political or technological threats.

The past witnessed the Soviet Union being the pivotal factor in the formulation of India's security policies. With that support now not there, India has had to reassess the responses to its external threat. In the past, India had never articulated its threats and the strategies to counter them. Even the Constitution of India was silent on this vital aspect till the requisite amendment was introduced in 1976. Unfortunately, India has always displayed some proclivity for Hara-kiri, when it comes to matters of security. More than half a century after independence and five wars with our neighbours, we continue to revel in strategic indifference. There is little awareness or understanding of the nature of security problems amongst our political hierarchy or the bureaucracy. The issues are seldom discussed in public for its reactions. The realisation that a strong economy backed by powerful armed forces can only insulate the nation against external threats has not been quite understood.

The nation has witnessed for the first time a notable shift in this area of major concern. The BJP led government, after taking over the reigns of the country,

immediately established the National Security Council, National Security Advisory Board, and the Strategic Planning Group in 1998. Unlike the Henderson Brooke Report on the 1962 debacle, which even after 40 years remains a classified document not open to public scrutiny, the government made public the report of the Kargil Review Committee. However, the government has yet to learn to make use of this infrastructure for regular inputs through periodic assessment of threats and evolve matching responses in advance. We must come out of "Delhi Door Ust" syndrome of the past and avoid knee jerk reactions after the calamity has already overtaken.

India's present security scenario is hardly reassuring. During its 55 years of existence, India has fought one war with China and four with Pakistan, current Indo-Pak stand off notwithstanding. These countries continue to threaten India's security even today.

Threat from Pakistan is in short and medium term and aims at destroying India's integrity. Whilst China is a long term threat, which transcends military perspective and aims at keeping India out of reckoning. The threat is not because of its phenomenal economic growth or military might but because of its insatiable ambition for global power status. However, what is far more threatening is the United States of America. Its paramount concern, reflected in its policies is to eliminate any threat, howsoever incipient or distant. It is quick to react in safeguarding its interests and employs mechanisms that

squeeze the target nation economically, militarily and technologically, once the diplomatic measures fail to coerce it.

Besides, there are other areas of concern that also have the potential of threatening India's security. These can be summarised as Middle-East situation, Pakistan's close religious and political links with the region, ethnic strife in Sri Lanka, China's aggressive power projection and economic penetration in South-East Asia and, last but not the least, overwhelming US maritime presence in the Indian Ocean and the Arabian Sea.

The Pakistan Threat

Divergent national ideologies have been largely responsible for perennially estranged relations between India and Pakistan. India's pluralism, secularism and democratic credentials are in direct conflict with Pakistan's Islamic fundamentalism, intolerance and totalitarian rule. Secondly, Pakistan's obsession with Kashmir, binding it to the situational reality, has aggravated this animosity. Thirdly, Pakistan's alliance with the US led bloc in 1954 and consequent economic and military aid encouraged parity with India, which it wanted to use not only to annex Kashmir by force, but also deny India its regional aspirations. The two have fought wars in 1947, 1965, 1971 and 1999, besides the decade and a half - old Pakistan imposed proxy war on India, and the consequent current stand off with full potential for war. Realising its inability to achieve its objectives through direct confrontation with the conventionally superior Indian Armed Forces, Pakistan resorted to encouraging and supporting secessionism in the Punjab and the North-East. Having failed, it switched over

to proxy war in Jammu and Kashmir, with similar objective of dismembering India. Whilst this war of attrition continues unabated, another concurrent irritant relating to Jammu and Kashmir is the ongoing confrontation over Siachen since 1984. The two armies have been facing each other with periodic engagements along the entire length of the Line of Control and the International Border. The situation remains explosive and has taken a worse turn after Pakistani terrorists struck at India's Parliament - the seat of power and symbol of democracy - on 13 December 2001. With neither side giving in, despite external influences, the energy-sapping deployment of the troops, with incumbent psychological and physiological implications, continues.

Pakistan's main threat to India's security emanates from the mindset of its military leadership. There are two main reasons for this. The first reason is Pakistan's disintegration in 1971, giving birth to Bangladesh. This is at the core of the military's animus towards India. Second, it feels that control of Jammu and Kashmir would not only provide emotional comfort but also provide it a degree of strategic depth, keep India at bay from its military heart around Rawalpindi-Islamabad axis and provide absolute control over rivers flowing through Jammu and Kashmir. Kargil 1999 was engineered to achieve these very objectives, by stages. The main threat from Pakistan is from its land forces only. Its Navy does not, as yet have any capability of sea denial to constrain Indian Navy's operations in the Arabian Sea. Lack of industrial capacity and financial resources preclude any possibility of Pakistan emerging as a major sea power. Its Air Force too poses no threat, numerically or technologically.

From the technology point of view, it would appear that the two land forces are by and large compatible. Although India has paid more attention to its Navy and the Air Force as compared to Pakistan, the lessons of Gulf War and Bosnia, highlighting the effects of high technology, precision guided munitions have not been assimilated by the IAF and applied in its strategic thinking, force structure and wherewithal. The military strategies would remain as hitherto in 1965 or 1971, with land forces remaining crucial to the conduct of war and the Navy and the Air Force playing supporting roles. However, there would be far more inter-Service integration and co-operation.

After the May 1998 nuclear tests by both the countries, the nuclear factor has changed the threat scenario altogether. Conventional forces would no longer determine the probability of war occurrence. The conventional military balance is not so important as the ability of each side to conduct proxy wars concurrently and threat to escalate the war to nuclear proportions. Nuclear deterrence, in which Pakistan sees a guarantee to its security and the consequent ability to push India against the wall without fear of retribution has complicated the war scenario between Pakistan and India. The Pakistan led proxy war in Jammu and Kashmir has not yet escalated into a conventional war, primarily because India is inhibited by the nuclear factor which was not there during the 1971 Indo-Pak War, when Pakistan had reacted with pre-emptive strikes over India. Pakistan's potential to raise the status should not, however, be under-estimated. It must be noted that any change in the status of Jammu and Kashmir will help Pakistan in projecting it as revenge of 1971 War and the creation of Bangladesh.

In reality, use of nuclear weapons as means of war is unthinkable, although according to Bruce Riedel, an assistant in Clinton's National Security Council, Pakistan was apparently preparing its nuclear arsenal for probable deployment during the Kargil conflict. Nawaz Sharif denied this when confronted with evidence by Clinton on 4 July 1998. Obviously, he was not aware of what his military was upto. In the 1990 Indo-Pak crisis, Seymore Hersh suggested that both India and Pakistan were on the brink of nuclear war and that it was averted by US intervention. However, in view of the horrified reaction from the global community to Pakistan's repeated flaunting of its 'First Use' option, Pakistan did mellow down. The danger lies in the fact that Pakistan's nuclear weapon programme is the exclusive preserve of its military establishment. Retaliatory nuclear tests of May 1998 were forced upon Nawaz Sharif by Pakistan, military to counter India militarily and to curb its regional influence.

In fact, even large-scale conventional wars seem to be unlikely because of the threat of nuclear weapons as a strategy. India has to, therefore, maintain substantial nuclear and conventional edge over Pakistan in order to dissuade it from venturing into its use. But the real danger in Indo-Pak context lies in the proxy war that Pakistan has imposed upon India since 1989. Interestingly, Musharraf said so in April 1999, when his men were infiltrating the Kargil heights across the Line of Control. He said that whilst the nuclear and conventional wars were unlikely, the probability of proxy war was on the rise. This is a clear manifestation of Pakistan's future strategy and intentions vis-à-vis India. Pakistan will continue to pose a threat to India till at least the issue of Jammu and Kashmir is sorted out to its advantage. Till

then, its anti-Indian military establishment will threaten India by resorting to cross border terrorism, and encouraging secessionism through religious and ethnic divide. It draws strength from its nuclear capability that in its perception has put India in a defensive mode.

India has to think beyond a conventional war in terms of evolving a holistic and integrated response to Pakistan sponsored proxy war. The Indian Armed Forces will have to play a much wider role and have to come out of their defensive land mind-set to develop major maritime and aerospace capability, capable of posing a much greater threat to Pakistan. To eradicate Pakistan's misperception that they have neutralised India's nuclear deterrence, India needs to move expeditiously to weaponise its nuclear triad, create command and control structure and build deterrence through transparency as well as opacity. Whilst the going is good, India could cultivate the US, though cautiously, to counter balance the threat from Pakistan and China. Last but not the least, borders will have to be effectively sealed to prevent induction of terrorists, arms, communication equipment, funds and medicines etc.

The Chinese Threat

Mao-tse-Tung was rather eager, despite Chou-en-Lai's dissuasion, to demonstrate Chinese might across the Himalayas. Having surreptitiously built the road through Aksai Chin, linking Xinjiang with Tibet and occupying territories elsewhere, his aim was to intimidate India. Forty years later, China is sitting comfortably with 38,000 sq. km of Indian territory under occupation, in addition to additional claim over eight of the nine districts in Arunachal Pradesh. India has not been able to do any thing and as time passes,

the probability of recovering the lost territories diminishes further.

China is India's largest neighbour and largest military power in Asia. Its economy is growing very fast with substantial resource generation. Its access to high technology weapons from Russia has changed the shape of things further. It has already started flexing muscles in pursuance of its drive to super power status. It projects its power at far off places and does not hesitate to use force where necessary in achieving its objectives.

In its impatience for super power status, it adopted a dual track strategy. Whilst on the one hand it went in for expeditious nuclearisation, missile development and four modernisations, on the other it continued to live with low technology but numerically superior armed forces. Once the highest priority given to the economy manifests itself, China will go in for total technological revolution.

It is for this reason that China does not want to get embroiled in any conflict with its neighbours unless imposed upon it. That is how it insists on following a policy of peace and tranquillity all along the borders. India is being lulled into towing the Chinese line, whose underlying rivalry remains as hitherto and whose conventional and nuclear arms build-up goes on unabated. Every major city in India is within the reach of Chinese missiles. This capability is being further augmented with the help of SLBMs. The asymmetry in terms of conventional and nuclear forces, man power and infrastructure is entirely in favour of China. Notwithstanding this, the probability of war across the Himalayas, despite the boundary dispute, is remote. A Sino-Indian war in the present context would not serve any strategic

objectives. China is already sitting pretty with large chunks of Indian territory under its occupation.

However, China's aggressive posture as witnessed often has a message in it. Though, it is quite subtle in avoiding direct confrontation, it does keep India engaged by proxy. It pursues friendly relations with India's neighbours with a purpose quite inimical to India's security interests. Pakistan has exploited this window of opportunity by developing close political, economic and military relations with China, whilst simultaneously remaining on the right side of the US. China has built a strategic road across the Khunjerab Pass to link it with Pakistan and it has developed Gwadar as a naval base, which will help it to maintain its presence in the Indian Ocean region. In a decade or so China will begin to interfere with India's interests in the Arabian Sea and the Indian Ocean. China has helped develop Pakistan's nuclear and missile capabilities. This has neutralised India's conventional military edge, letting Pakistan pursue its policy of terrorism with impunity.

China has also been wooing Myanmar, not so much in propping it against India as creating infrastructure that would facilitate its land, and maritime operations against India in times to come. China has built a network of roads that connect Kuming in Yunnan with Myanmar and further to Ledo and Tinsukia in India. It has setup naval bases along the Myanmar coast, including the one at Coco Island next to India's Andaman and Nicobar islands, which would help it to monitor activities in India. China is thus treading on India's toes by extending its influence in India's maritime territorial jurisdiction. China's aim is to: -

- (a) Limit India's influence in Asia and prevent it from emerging as a regional power.
- (b) Keep India engaged with its neighbours to drain resources whilst developing its economy and military.
- (c) Check India's progress by opposing its nuclearisation, and missile and space programmes.
- (d) Pose military threats to coerce India into not seeking its lost territories.
- (e) Contain India by surrounding from all sides.

The potential for future disputes and military rivalry continues to exist. Is India still so overawed that we continue to follow weak policies towards China? China's suzerainty over Tibet was accepted without the slightest murmur, as also the Chinese occupation of Aksai Chin. When this became public, attempts were made to justify it. Neglect of India's Armed Forces and the state of their preparedness, or the lack of it, for war by government was an open invitation to China before they actually struck in 1962. The Chinese might and policies seem to have brought out India's state of helplessness and consequent acquiescent responses. China got Mr. Narasimha Rao to sign the Treaty of Peace and Tranquillity in September 1993, accepting Chinese occupation of Aksai Chin, with a proviso that India would not try to recover it by means of force in the future. India signed the treaty without any quid pro quo from the Chinese side in regard to its claim over Arunachal Pradesh or recognition of Sikkim as a part of India. This was a clear sign of weakness and tacit surrender. Such

policies only give message to others that India is a soft state and that its boundaries are not sacrosanct.

The first task for India is to remove such perceptions and convey with clarity its strength and the resolve to meet any threat. Firm but flexible responses, unlike the acquiescence of the past, should convey this message. However, it must be realised that four decades later, the Sino-Indian balance of power has further tilted in favour of China. Second, armed conflict between two nuclear powers, however remote, is fraught with danger of escalation. Third, it would be hard to find any international support for military venture against China. Fourth, the cost factor and its adverse impact on Indian economy are other factors to reckon with.

Sino-Indian rapprochement seems to be the only alternative available at this juncture. It is too late in the day to think of any hard options. However, the policy of rapprochement must be accompanied by simultaneous build up in India's land forces, maritime capabilities and aerospace power, including nuclear and missile capabilities, lest it should be misconstrued as a sign of decrepitude. The build-up will not only enable India to meet the future challenges from China but also help pose counter threat in time to come. In fact, we erred post-May 1998 explosions when we did not play the nuclear deterrence card against China and instead concentrated on Pakistan which could have been deterred by conventional forces.

The US Threat

India's policy of non-alignment was an anathema to the US, which had an inhibiting effect in evolving Indo-US relations. Despite India's democratic credentials and political

stability, the US went ahead to ally with Pakistan in 1954. This brought the cold war to the subcontinent, which in ultimate analysis resulted in creating instability in the region.

The end of the cold war saw the emergence of the US as a dominant economic and military power. It was also witness to India's more liberal economic policies which made India important to the US and the US to India. There was a mutual rush to embrace each other. By mid Nineties, the US was India's largest trading partner and the main source of technology and investment. The US began to show interest in developing a strategic relationship with India.

Several road blocks did appear en route. India went ahead with testing the Prithvi missile in defiance of US warnings and acquired cryogenic engines for its space programme from Russia. A cooling of relations and suspicions about US sincerity did develop.

The US is a discriminating partner whose sole aim is to secure its own national interests. It has a track record of discarding allies after its own purpose is served. The prevailing Indo-US efforts towards military co-operation and strategic alliance have to be viewed in this context. India must not forget that its defence projects, indigenous missile and space programmes, and nuclear weapon capability are perceived by the US as threats to its long term security and commercial interests. The US would continue to make attempts to nip these in the bud, ostensibly in the interest of non-proliferation. But in reality, the aim is to prevent others from acquiring nuclear weapon capability and preclude future threats from the developing and threshold nations. To achieve these

objectives, the US went on to create restrictive regimes like the 'Atoms for Peace' plan of President Eisenhower, IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency), NPT (Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty), CTBT (Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty), MTCR (Missile Technology Control Regime), and other coercive measures, like the Glenn, Pressler and Symington Amendments. To ensure that these instruments delivered, the US followed a policy of incentives and disincentives in the form of aids and sanctions. Depending upon the US interest, this policy is applied selectively. Whilst Israel and Pakistan were allowed to go ahead with their nuclear weapons programmes, India was severely pressurised to sign the NPT. In the process, the US even targeted India's nuclear energy programme.

In fact, the NPT was primarily aimed at preventing India from going nuclear overtly. However, India is not a signatory to the NPT. There are reasons for it. Firstly, this was highly discriminatory and non-universal treaty, and; secondly, because India's main adversary China was already a recognised nuclear power, India could not afford to sign away its right to self-defence. But when Pakistan also did not sign it, the US did not pressurise it the way it pressurised India to sign the NPT. It was primarily the US pressure that compelled India to wait for a quarter of a century before it could exercise what came to be known as the 'nuclear option'. India was consequently left trailing way behind China who already had a decade-old lead.

The CTBT too was targeted against India, besides of course China, to prevent them from conducting nuclear tests forever. And to make a nuclear device without test

detonation would have been technologically beyond India's reach. Similar attempts were made to undermine India's ballistic missile programme through other control regimes. The MTCR was conceived by the US in liaison with G-7 industrialised countries to prevent transfer of missile and rocket technologies to countries like India who were aspiring to develop their own missiles systems.

There have been serious attempts by the West, particularly the US, to undermine India's space and missile programmes for reasons of commercial competition and perceived threat. India's civilian rocket and satellite development programmes suffered at the hands of the US, because these indirectly supported India's Agni and Prithvi missile projects. The US went to the extent of warning India to refrain from developing ballistic missile capability when India successfully test launched the Agni missile in May 1998. After the May 1998 nuclear tests/explosion, the US slammed sanctions on India, which meant termination of development assistance in various areas, including Defence. Economic sanctions and technology denial policies upset India's space, missile and LCA (Light Combat Aircraft) development programmes. In fact, the LCA support programme, agreed to in 1998, was frozen instantly by the US.

Militarily if there is any threat, it comes from the US Navy, which has substantial presence in the Indian Ocean region. The US has large naval and air assets in Diego Garcia. Besides, its nuclear powered and nuclear-armed aircraft carriers and submarines keep showing their presence in the Indian Ocean and the Bay of Bengal. Presence of such a formidable maritime force is only indicative of the intentions of the sole

super power to intervene wherever its interests are perceived as affected. India cannot remain immune to this policy when it comes to Pakistan as a factor in Indo-US relations. It must be remembered that during the 1971 Indo-Pak War, the US had dispatched its naval fleet to the Bay of Bengal. US interests in the region are governed by its global perceptions. However, the policies designed to support Pakistan and its ambitions have only heightened India's security concerns.

Interestingly, when India endorsed the US's National Missile Defence programme, suspension of military contacts was done away immediately. General Shelton visited India in July 2001, the Defence Policy Group was revived and inter Service exercises began once more, in earnest. The US's aim is to bring India under its NMD umbrella, thereby halting India's missile development programme.

India must be cautious in rushing to embrace the US. Indo-US relations are a long history of love and hate. The US has always had a negative agenda concerning India, be it human rights, nuclear programme, space programme or the missile programme. Even the pace of India's economic reforms was being hastened by it.

The US' current collaboration with Pakistan, a terrorist state by all accounts, in fighting terrorism in Afghanistan is seen in India with suspicion. Pakistan continues to harbour Osama-bin-Laden and the Taliban leadership, and exports terrorism into Jammu and Kashmir. These are facets the US is not unaware of. The US is not fully responsive to India's concerns about Pakistan sponsored cross border terrorism. Its foreign policy is structured to meet the requirements of its

own perceived threats. India should not expect too much from the US, so far as terrorism in India is concerned. Undue dependence on the US will only help it find a foothold in India and meddle in the state of Jammu and Kashmir. This was quite evident during Secretary of State Colin Powell's recent visit to India when he said that Jammu and Kashmir was now on international agenda. It was communism first and Al Qaeda now against which the US helped Pakistan economically as well as militarily. Such US policies in the subcontinent have only forced India to shift priorities from development to defence. Being the sole super power, the US would try to impose its will on others. It may even insist on its own version of democratic values, human rights and free market economy. It may even coerce or threaten directly or indirectly second rung powers like Russia not to cooperate with countries like India, who may pose threats in the future. In fact, India has already experienced this in regard to the cryogenic engines.

How should India respond to the US? These multifarious threats notwithstanding, the importance of US to India cannot be denied. India has to do a tight rope walk in preserving its interests without confrontation with the US. Second, India must continue to develop its relations with Russia for its political, diplomatic and military support. Third, economic and military build up must remain priority for India. Economic viability is essential for military to be effective. The USSR collapsed despite being a military super power because of its economic breakdown. India needs to spell out with clarity its threats, challenges and the interests together with its national policy and the doctrine to ensure that these are not compromised.

Conclusion

Threats and challenges, whatever be their nature, require perceptive analysis of their sources. Threat evaluation and matching responses must remain an ongoing process. The only way to ensure stability in inter-state

relations is to have strong economy backed by powerful armed forces. Weakness invites aggression. A strong India would be capable of warding off threats to its security and also counter veiled threats to its smaller neighbours.

CHAIRMAN'S REMARKS

I thank you for bringing out, very clearly, the direct and indirect threats to India both from recognised adversaries as well as some recognised friends.

The next presentation is by Major General Rajendra Nath. He was commissioned from the IMA Dehradun on 21 December 1947. He was the first Indian officer to patrol the Aksai Chin area in 1952. He has attended the Canadian Army Staff College Course, when it used to be of two years duration. He has been an Instructor in the Defence Services Staff College, Wellington. He has commanded 10 Infantry

Division and has been the Chief of Staff of 2 Corps. He has been an active participant in the 1971 Indo-Pak War; he was commanding a brigade there. He retired as Commandant of the Indian Military Academy. He is the author of 'Military Leadership in India: From Vedic Period to Indo-Pakistan Wars'. He edited the book on Indian Security Threats and Strategies and Musharraf's War. He has been an active social worker in Chandigarh. It is good for the Services community that he has been recognised for his social work by the Chandigarh administration.

FIRST SESSION : SECOND PAPER**MAJOR GENERAL RAJENDRA NATH, PVSM (RETD)**

Incredible as it may seem, and to the utter bewilderment of strategists world over, Pakistan, with half the strength of the Indian Armed Forces, one fifth in area and a worthless economy, is carrying on a fairly successful terrorist campaign in J and K for the last ten years. The Indian leadership seems to be underestimating the economic losses, the uncalled for sacrifices of our valiant security forces as well as the negative effect on international opinion. Our successive governments have not been paying the necessary attention to the security threat from Pakistan for the last so many years.

The malaise is in fact deeper; as a nation, we were often vanquished by the foreign invaders, who ruled over our country for long periods. This could be assigned to the fact that Indians tend to be very peace loving and contented by nature, interested more in spiritual and other intellectual pursuits than in the development of the art of war or the security of our country. We seldom attacked other countries and in fact fought battles well inside our own country. We have developed a passive and defensive outlook that has not altered since Independence, inspite of three and a half wars with Pakistan and one with China. We, therefore, need to have a hard look at our ethos, our outlook towards security requirements and not make a habit of underestimating Pakistani threat of proxy war or terrorist campaign in J and K, which is in need of strong counter measures.

An important aspect of warfare is that no armed forces should carry out large scale operations in an area which suits the enemy,

or fight with those weapons which again suit the enemy forces than your own. This is precisely what is happening in J and K since the last one decade. Terrain wise, the mountainous, forested and undeveloped countryside of J and K is ideally suitable for a terrorist campaign. Pakistan, based upon its extensive experience in Afghanistan, is carrying out the campaign in J and K in a very systematic manner. Afghanistan was the first campaign of its kind in history in which a world power with modern weapon systems was defeated by well organised and well equipped terrorist forces, which at that time had the blessings of the USA, the developed countries, as well as the opportunistic Pakistanis. We must not forget that this terrorist campaign in J & K is a regular instrument of state policy to get hold of the State by forcing India and its Armed Forces to vacate the state. The Soviet Union did so after suffering 56000 killed and massive economic losses in Afghanistan.

In J and K, it is the infantry, supported by artillery, that fights while our superior armoured forces and superior artillery sit idle along the long plains border with Pakistan. Our Air Force is not utilised, while our Navy continues to cruise the Indian ocean. It looks as if we are fighting the terrorist campaign in J and K as dictated by Pakistan. No other country in the world would suffer unnecessary casualties in one part of its territory while its superior forces are sitting idle in the rest of the country. The assiduous shedding of blood by the Indian Jawans and officers in the fight against terrorists, seems to be of little consequence to our leaders and the country.

Pakistan's Policy

Pakistan is flush with weapons supplied by the USA during the Afghan war, which are suitable for mountain and jungle warfare in J and K. It is also equipping terrorists with modern night fighting devices. Pakistan is equipping and sending thousands of terrorists, even though it is making promises that it has stopped cross border terrorism. Of course, Pakistan increases or decreases the flow of the cross border terrorism depending upon the situation, knowing fully well that India is playing the game in accordance with Pakistan's strategy, by remaining on the defensive. This could be partly attributed to India's policy of not crossing the Line of Control and partly to Pakistan's threat of use of nuclear weapons in the event of India crossing Line of Control/Border. In January 2002, Pakistan loaded its missiles and later moved them forward and activated its nuclear bases from where its aircraft can carry nuclear weapons onto the targets into India. Actually both India and Pakistan can fire missiles with flight time of three to five minutes from launch to impact. While Pakistan believes in the use of nuclear weapons whenever its security is threatened, India declared in 1998, a 'no first use' policy. There is considerable risk involved in making such declarations regarding use of nuclear weapons.

Indians seem to be good at giving unnecessary promises and particularly being generous to Pakistan. We promised plebiscite in J and K. We stopped forward movement of our forces in 1949 in J and K when Pakistani forces were on the run and of course we released 99,000 prisoners in 1971 and now we gave orders to our forces not to cross the Line of Control in the Kargil war. Meanwhile, Pakistan is playing upon our fears

by threats of nuclear use and forcing us to make no cross border raids even in J and K in retaliation to Pakistan's cross border terrorism.

Islamisation of J and K

Islamisation is in fact a force multiplier for Pakistan's terrorism in J and K. Pakistan is successfully carrying out Islamisation in J and K by forcing out all non-Muslims from the State. Islamisation has succeeded in the Valley, with 3 ½ to 4 lakh Kashmiri Pandits having been thrown out. Now other non-Muslims are being forced out from Doda region and Riasi - Naoshera area in Jammu. Once these non-Muslims are forced out, the terrorists easily establish their hideouts and their intelligence network functions better. So long as Islamisation spreads in J and K and the non-Muslims are forced out, the terrorist movement gets a boost. Local population can be helpful in dealing with terrorism, if they are pro-government or pro-armed forces. If strict action is not taken to control Islamisation, it is likely that Jammu and Ladakh regions may also become Muslim majority areas with terrorist hideouts and terrorist operations getting a boost in the coming fifteen to twenty years. So, India has to take immediate action against terrorists. Incidentally, Pakistan is using nuclear weapons capability and terrorism to scare Indian political leadership as well as the Western countries. So far, Pakistan has been successful in impressing not only India but the international countries as well.

US Attitude and its Effect on Indo-Pak Relations and Terrorism in J and K

The USA and Pakistan are old friends, while India has only recently succeeded in establishing reasonable relations with USA.

The Pakistani Generals get along well with the American Generals, like General Antony Zinni and General Colin Powell, and erstwhile bureaucrats who have been against India's policy of Non-Alignment as well as its pro-communist policies during the decade long conflict in Afghanistan. The US seems to be giving preference to Pakistan's interest in Jammu and Kashmir due to the following reasons:-

- a) The US wants Pakistan to help its forces in tracking down Bin Laden and his top lieutenants.
- (b) The USA wants Pakistan to deal firmly with the Al Qaeda terrorists, who are the most dangerous terrorists in South Asia at present and can be a danger to the USA and Western countries in due course of time.
- (c) The USA wants Pakistan to help them in dealing with terrorist camps as well as terrorist organisations, in order to curb the growing menace of terrorism in South Asia and be able to pull out its forces from the Pakistan-Afghanistan region. Pakistan has promised much but is doing little on the ground.
- (d) The USA is not attaching much importance to Pak sponsored terrorism in J and K. It obviously wants Pakistan to gain at India's expense in J and K, in return for Pakistan's help in controlling terrorism in South Asia.
- (e) The USA wants to have an oil and gas pipe line running for Central Asia to Pakistan in order to export Central Asian oil and gas through Pakistan's ports. So Pakistan can be a conduit for US economic interests.

(f) Finally, the USA needs Pakistan as an important and close friend in the Middle East where it is facing opposition from countries like Iran and Iraq.

(g) The USA has agreed to sell military hardware to Pakistan in return for Pak help to deal with terrorists like Bin Laden.

Though there is no danger to India's security from the US, its economic, political and military support to Pakistan would obviously make Pakistan stronger. This can pose problems for India in the ongoing terrorist campaign in J and K. The USA underestimates Pakistan's hatred for India. The USA does not understand that Pakistan is fighting a well organised proxy war, as a terrorist campaign in J and K in its attempts to get hold of J and K in retaliation for the 1971 Indo-Pak debacle. Unfortunately, many in India also underestimate the depth of hatred which Pakistani leaders have for India, as well as the extent to which they can go to harm India. Hence, it is no use blaming the US leaders for their reactions regarding Indo-Pak relations. India has to cultivate relations with the US without sacrificing its national interests in J and K.

Danger from China

China, an emerging world power, is too busy in building itself up as a powerful economic, military and politically powerful country in the world. It is using Pakistan to keep India militarily and economically mired in serious problems. China would continue to help Pakistan militarily and economically to fight its war of terrorism in J&K. However, China has its own weak spots, which can pose dangerous internal problems for it.

These are the regions of Tibet and Sinkiang. Further, the Chinese cannot be oblivious of the political dangers to itself from the spate of terrorism in South Asia.

Though China and Pakistan would like to cut India to size, the former would not join in any open war against India. It has its own serious military problems against Taiwan and Japan and knows that neither South Korea nor the South East countries would trust the Chinese. The US's liking for China is due to economic reasons, which can turn into economic competition and later into military confrontation as China grows in world stature. China is thus conscious of the likely US reactions in the years to come and does not want India to become a permanent enemy, who will then side with the USA against China. In international affairs, there are no permanent friends or enemies. Meanwhile, China would continue to help Pakistan in economic and military affairs so that it can confront India in South Asia. Though there seems to be no direct threat from China to India, there is an indirect threat via Pakistan, which is likely to continue.

India's Response

India finds itself in a difficult position while looking for a useful response which would deal with the serious problem of terrorism in J and K. India has traditionally followed a defensive and even a passive policy. It is not likely to follow an offensive policy, unless it is forced by the emergence of some new factors.

Winning the Confidence of the People of J and K

The Indian Government is not likely to cross the Line of Control in response to the

persistent cross border terrorism by Pakistan. It has promised not to do so. It seems that it will continue to fight the terrorist campaign as it has been doing so far, hoping that attrition of Pak terrorist forces, as well as Pakistan's weak economy, would adversely affect terrorism. This policy is not likely to succeed unless the US and other Western countries go all out to force Pakistan to stop terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir. For India, it would be neither wise nor logical to depend upon the USA to solve its age-old problems with Pakistan.

India should make all out efforts to look after and win the confidence of the people of Jammu and Kashmir. It would help us in fighting terrorism in J and K in a more effective manner. We should hold elections at all levels whenever due, as well as run the administration in a reasonably honest and effective manner. The people of the valley are slowly changing their pro Pak attitude and if we take effective measures to give them a cleaner administration, Pakistan's efforts to spread terrorism would become less effective.

Corruption

The widespread net of corruption in India is playing havoc with our country's security. Because of this malaise, Pakistan is able to easily send money and weapons to terrorists in J and K, and in fact has been doing so for years. Our intelligence agencies, political leaders as well as administrators know it well. We could deal with terrorism in J and K in a better manner if we curb corruption. A few years ago while visiting the border to write a paper on cross border smuggling in Rajasthan, I was appalled by the attitude of the politicians and the administration to smuggling that was taking

place from across the border. To stop terrorism corruption must be brought under control. Corruption is in fact undermining our security and is indirectly supporting terrorism. Shall our rulers care to look into the crystal ball and face the truth?

COUNTER MEASURES BY INDIA

In North J and K

India cannot deal successfully with Pakistan-inspired terrorism in J and K, while remaining on the defensive. We must use our initiative and deal with the soft spots existing in Pakistan. The Kashmiris in the northern part of J and K (POK) cannot forget the useless sacrifices made by the Northern Light Infantry Jawans and officers in the Kargil War. This fact could be made known on a wider scale through radio and TV, to win over the people by smuggling money and consumer products into that region. The people are poor, belong to Shia community and are being ruthlessly suppressed by Pakistani rulers who are Sunnis. The Government, RAW and other intelligence agencies must look into this aspect.

In North West Frontier Province (NWFP)

The Pathans of NWFP never wanted to join Pakistan in 1947. The Frontier Gandhi, respected leader of NWFP, never forgave the Indian leaders for handing over the Pathans to the Punjabi rulers of Pakistan. Like NWFP, the Pathans are inhabiting Eastern and Southern part of Afghanistan also. Now that our government is helping Afghanistan economically, we must pump in lots of money into NWFP to win over of the people of NWFP, who do not like to be ruled by the Punjabis of Pakistan. If Pathans of Afghanistan can be friendly to India, why can't

the Pathans of NWFP be, who were in fact in the forefront of India's independence struggle.

India needs to plan in a big way. We have to spend a lot of money, but it will help us in the ongoing bitter terrorist campaign in J and K. Pakistan is not going to give up its terrorist campaign unless it itself faces danger. The NWFP and the Pathans of the region who do not like the Punjabi rulers need to be cultivated by India on 'Top Priority' and in a big way.

One Ministry to Deal with J and K

India should have one Ministry for J and K, to deal with this very complicated and dangerous problem which may lead to the next Indo-Pak war. We have at present half a dozen ministries dealing with J and K. There is hardly any co-ordination between so many ministries. This aspect has to be looked into by the Central Government.

Strengthening Armed Forces

Lastly, our Government must make our armed forces strong enough to deter Pakistan from sending terrorists across the border. What one can comprehend from the present attitude of Pakistan's Government is that India should expect continued terrorism and an increase in its intensity. The recent Pakistani attack and capture of a piquet in Gurez valley, which is well on the Indian side of the border, indicates Pakistan's future intentions. The politicians and the administrators may forget the massacre at Kaluchak, which was targeted at the Army, but the Jawans are unhappy. It affects their morale. So India may one day be forced to carry out cross border strikes by the Air Force, as well as by the Army. It would be to our benefit to strengthen

the Armed Forces to cater for such an eventuality.

Pros and Cons of Raids Across the Line of Control

Since India has been indirectly permitting Pakistan to carry out terrorism across the Line of Control in J and K, some Indian political leaders and intellectuals believe that any counter raids by India across the Line of Control in J and K could be counter productive. India may get adverse criticism from other countries like the USA and other Western Democracies, not to forget China. We in India often tend to attach more importance to international opinion than we should. The interest of our country is foremost. Our army and paramilitary forces have been at the receiving end in J and K for the last ten years, suffering casualties and hardship in the process. The worst is that they have to be on the defensive all the time and react in a passive manner. Eventually, it might affect their morale. So, India has to carry out raids across the Line of Control to give Pakistan a dose of their own medicine.

Our strong Air Force should be utilised to carry out raids across the Line of Control in Jammu and Kashmir. The likely targets should be Pakistan's training camps and the long lines of communications that connect Pakistan with northern part of Jammu and Kashmir. The bridges, culverts and winding hilly roads can be blasted to interfere in normal maintenance of the northern part of Jammu and Kashmir. So far Pakistani terrorists have been targeting our roads in Jammu and Kashmir by planting mines and explosives, inflicting casualties and loss on our forces and civilians. Interference with their communications will alert them to be careful

in not interfering on our side of the border. The USA continued to bombard Yugoslavia for months despite criticism. We in India should learn to take criticism in stride, for terrorism is affecting our security. The obvious reaction from Pakistan's Air Force should be catered for in our planning for our contemplated air raids. Helicopter borne operations by the Army across the Line of Control can also be considered. This could make Pakistan think twice before launching their raids across the Line of Control, as it recently did in Gurez valley in Jammu and Kashmir.

A certain amount of risk, proper planning to cater for Pak reactions and strong nerves are required by our civil and military leaders to put this policy into action. Otherwise, Pakistan would continue its terrorist campaign in Jammu and Kashmir for years to come, till it achieves its aim.

Report by Rand Corporation

The NDRI - RAND's National Defence Research Institute is a federally funded research and development centre, sponsored by the office of the Secretary of Defence, the Joint Staff, the Unified Commands, the Defence Agencies and the Department of the Navy. The Report by RAND on Kargil War is interesting and throws new light on the Jammu and Kashmir dispute, as well as on the Kargil War. It states that the presence of nuclear weapons by both Pakistan and India did not deter the Kargil conflict. The US intervention was required to do so. India now knows that Pakistan can be reckless and adventurist and uses nuclear threat to keep India from fighting a major war. The report states that Pakistan has two types of Jehadi forces, Pakistan based "Guest Militants" or indigenous Kashmiri Groups who

operate in Jammu and Kashmir as Pakistani volunteers. Pakistan has many options. It can limit the operations of the terrorists to Jammu and Kashmir alone or to extend them to other parts of India. According to the RAND Report, Pakistan is inducting terrorists not only in J&K but also in other parts to indulge in terrorist activities.

Conclusion

It is obvious that the Indian Government has to take a major decision to deal with

Pak sponsored terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir without losing much time. The present defensive measures are not bringing about useful results. If the government takes no offensive measures, both political and military, the country and the Army will continue to suffer unnecessarily. Lastly, the political party in power at the Centre is getting unnecessary criticism regarding the continuing terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir. The status-quo is not going to help it. An answer has to be found before the next general elections; the government is answerable to the electorate.

CHAIRMAN'S REMARKS

I thank you for giving us your perception of the threat that India faces as also for describing our defensive attitudes and some overt and covert counter measures. I now request Brigadier Satish Issar to make the presentation. He is a coursemate of mine from the IMA. He was commissioned with me in June 1959. He has commanded 5 Kumaon Battalion. He has been the Military Advisor to Chief of the Army Staff, General T P Raina. He served as GSO-1, 16 Corps; commanded the Kumaon Regimental Centre

and he has commanded 64 Mountain Brigade in North Sikkim. He is one of the very few officers who have commanded a Kumaon and a Naga Battalion, when it became part of his regiment. He was Instructor, Senior Command Wing, at the College of Combat, Mhow. He is a Resident Representative of the Centre of Technology Development, Bangalore, as well as member of the Asia Centre at Bangalore. He has also been very active in Kumaon Hills in various community development activities.

FIRST SESSION : THIRD PAPER**BRIG SATISH K ISSAR, VSM (RETD)**

"To endeavour to understand the India of today would be the task of a brave man. To describe tomorrow's India would verge on madness." Jawahar Lal Nehru - Maulana Azad Memorial Lecture, New Delhi, 1959

"Perhaps no Country In the world had been as truly made, geographically, for unity, as the Indian Sub Continent". Jawaharlal Nehru in his autobiography in 1936

Nehru had realised that no nation had as much potential for 'disunity' - thanks partly to its misinterpreted history - as India, and between the reality of a well defined, culturally inter-linked landmass, and the birth of a modern nation state, would lie many pitfalls.¹

In Indian history, two periods have been notably significant. Two hundred and fifty years before Christ, Ashoka spread Buddhism within India and even beyond its shores, but apparently, Ashoka did not leave any sense of common identity. The second period was the rule of the Mughal Emperor Akbar, whose administrative structure held together his vast empire in the 16th century. It was the British railways which truly united India through communication network, and it was the British collector in the district who taught Indians how to rule themselves.² But the question that arises is whether India was ever really a 'nation' during nearly 200 years of British Rule? The answer is in the negative. Even at the time of Partition, nearly half of India was not ruled by the British but by their native allies, who ruled with the help of Indian administrators. These numbered 565 princely states on this sub continent, which (territory) was technically not part of India. A separate accession treaty had to be obtained from each one of these princely states at the time of Independence.² Rulers of States of

Hyderabad, Junagadh and Jammu & Kashmir initially vacillated, but ultimately joined the Indian Union.

This fabric of geographical unity was torn apart when the Indian subcontinent was partitioned on 15th August 1947, into India and Pakistan. India has embraced the history, cultures, values and aspirations of a richly plural society, and combines many streams and traditions down the ages. What happened in 1947 left the fabric of Pakistan weak and prone to further tearing apart. Pakistan has already lost its Eastern Wing to a new nation - Bangladesh, in December 1971. It is too early in the history of both these nation to be convinced whether Gandhi's philosophy of a 'united secular India' or Jinnah's 'Two-Nation theory', was right. From its very inception, it was difficult to see how both could survive together. The emergence of Bangla Desh did prove that religion alone could never be the binding factor, to keep Pakistan united.

National Security

A nation's physical security and the welfare of its people are totally interlinked. It is of no use having an impregnable fortress built around poverty stricken and ethnically divided population. On the other hand, social and economic well being can only be assured

in a secure and harmonious environment. After all, national security is the means and protection that a nation provides for preserving its core values; the political, economic and social well being and preservation of sovereign state, the inviolability of our territorial boundaries and the maintenance of national interest within the strategic frontiers of India. Related to national security is the national aspiration amongst the citizens of the country. This pride in the citizens, in this case, all Indians, is the foundation on which the national security of India will rest. While delivering the National Security Lecture at the USI in 1995, Jaswant Singh had outlined the co-efficient of power to be economic strength of country; military potential and capability; technological base; industrial production ; social cohesion ; and national Will.

Analysis of the above co-efficient confirms that we as a nation are an emerging power, our sources of power lie in the technological base and the trained human resource in our country. India has so far not been able to exploit the full potential and harness nation building. India's story of the past five decades, states Stephen Cohen, has been one of "ambition aplenty, but marked underachievement." He further opines that India's security problems stem as much from domestic sources as from abroad. He feels that India's foreign policy making institutions desperately need an overhaul. That the military is kept out of the decision making process, is absurd.

India's Security Environment

India's security environment is mainly affected by threat from two of our neighbours, China and Pakistan. A great deal of aspects

of economic co-operation, and establishment of joint working groups (JWG), have eased the post-1962 hostility. The attitude of successive Pakistan Governments towards India, however, remains rigid and hostile. It is also true that China has in the past encouraged insurgency in the North East region of our country, but it is Pakistan which has kept India engaged in a 'Low Intensity Conflict' (LIC). Pakistan has a fixation over J & K, due to which, relations between India and Pakistan cannot improve. The trained manpower of erstwhile Taliban, who had fled from Afghanistan, is lying low in POK and Northern areas with the connivance of the ISI. Not only Pakistan and its intelligence agency (ISI) have been working overtime in promoting disaffection and dissidence amongst the minorities in India through Al Qaeda sympathisers, but also in the neighbouring SAARC countries, notably Nepal.

Global Terrorism Threat and India

Till recently, the Pak supported Taliban regime, with the Al Qaeda organisation of Osama Bin Laden, had its tentacles spread in Africa, Asia and Europe, posing a major threat to the Western democracies (mostly Christians).

In Washington's earlier assessment, Iraq, Iran, Syria and Libya were major sources of terrorism-threat to the West. The Gulf War launched by the USA and its allies against Iraq, ten years ago, has remained unfinished as per President George Bush's perception, because neither Iraq nor Iran has changed their leadership or their policies. While Iran has been making some overtures of reconciliation towards the USA, displacement of President Saddam Hussain

of Iraq continues to be on the top of the USA's agenda. Fearing a major Islamic backlash, this time, most of the allies of the USA are counselling caution on Washington, to prevent any hasty war on Iraq. Iraq this time has been able to garner the sympathy of most of its Arab neighbours. This is despite the fact that Iraq and Syria are the two Islamic Arab countries with socialistic beliefs and are considered a challenge to the traditional Islam of the Kings and Emirs. Even progressive countries like Egypt and Libya replaced their monarchs with the Army. Afghanistan had its mild king replaced with dictators, who were ruthless and harsh, culminating in the control by Taliban. The birth of Bangladesh as a democratic sovereign state was short lived because the Army of this newly liberated country bloodied its hands with the assassination of Sheikh Mujib-ur-Rehman and his family members, to establish Army dictatorship. It is after much bloodshed and Army rule that Bangladesh has returned to democracy.

According to M J Akbar, all Muslims live in two dimensions; one is the circle of nationalism, the other is circle of Brotherhood. National identity coexists with commitments to the world faith, pride in a unique history and passions that override national boundaries. It has been further analysed by M J Akbar that in an age of despair, the need for a hero who can inspire pan Islamic victory becomes acute. The situation today is similar to that which existed nearly 1000 years before, when Crusaders conquered Jerusalem and Christians established powerful states in the heart of Palestine, in territory, approximate to where Israel exists today. Perhaps Osama Bin Laden and his chief followers see in themselves the role of spreading and purifying Islam. Therefore,

there is every possibility that the USA and its allies will not only face the defiance of Iraqi rulers, but a unified defence from most of the Islamic countries, particularly in the Middle East. To this, even Pakistan's President Musharraf has added his voice by stating that only countries in the world today at the receiving end of war against global terrorism are the Islamic countries.

India, has one of the largest Muslim population, besides that of Indonesia (approx. 150 million). Hence, engineering acts of terrorism against politically vital targets will remain a major threat for India. Besides the challenge from Central Asian and Middle Eastern Islamic countries, India also will be affected by the Muslim domination of the ASEAN Countries.

International Islamic Front and the Al-Qaeda Threat

Recent information has confirmed that Al-Qaeda members have been working on developing the ability to use chemical weapons. Apart from Al Qaeda there are other Islamic organisations including the International Islamic Front, responsible for various acts of terrorism even in Pakistan. It is well known that Osama Bin Laden is the head of Al Qaeda, and of a united front of like minded Islamic terrorist organisations called the International Islamic Front for Jihad against the USA and Israel. The distinction between the Al Qaeda and the International Islamic Front is that the former is a Saudi centric organisation consisting exclusively of Arabs, mostly Saudis and Yemeni Tribes, plus some representation of Egyptians, Algerians, Moroccans, Palestinians and others. The International Islamic Front is a united front of the Al Qaeda, the Taliban,

five terrorist organisations of Pakistan, three of Egypt, two of Uzbekistan and one each of the Philippines and Xinjiang. There are other nationalities which are also controlled by the International Islamic Front, such as the Chechens, the Rohingya Muslims of the Arakan states of Myanmar, the Bangladeshis, the Thais, the Malaysians, the Indonesians and even some Americans and West Europeans.

Before 7 October 2001, the International Islamic Front's infrastructure was based partly in Afghanistan and partly in Pakistan. The Afghanistan-based infrastructure, which consisted of the trained cadres of all the constituents of the Front, focused on operations against the Northern Alliance, the USA and Israel. The Pakistan-based infrastructure, which consisted essentially of the trained cadres of the five Pakistani constituents of the International Islamic Front, concentrated on the operations against India. The Al Qaeda organisation had been nourishing a dream of spreading the Islamic culture. Neither Europe nor America can say that they are not affected by the invasion of Islamic ideology being spread through highly trained and motivated workers, some of whom are also the Fidayeen (suicide warriors).

Jammu and Kashmir happen to be only a small part of the Islamic chessboard. The struggle in Jammu and Kashmir in the last decade had been an attempt to divide the state on religious basis. In fact, the rise of Taliban in Afghanistan coincided with increased militancy in Jammu and Kashmir, by giving a more Islamic character to this problem. There was a call for setting up an Islamic Caliphate in Kashmir, articulated by Pakistan's Jamaat-i-Islami, in February 1992.

In fact, the Jamaat Chief, Khaji Hussein Ahmed gave a call for "a great Islamic State spreading from (Jammu and) Kashmir to Central Asia that would emerge after the independence of (Jammu and) Kashmir".

It is of interest for us to note as to why Pakistan felt it necessary to induct foreign militants into the Jammu and Kashmir scenario. The local Kashmiri militants were initially motivated to fight for Azadi (Independence) and not merger with Pakistan. This created a situation in the Nineties whereby the Pakistani rulers feared the spread of an 'Independent Kashmir' movement to Pakistan Occupied Kashmir. In order to curb the votaries of Azadi, groups like the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front were sidelined to make way for the Afghan and other foreigners trained in Afghanistan. Statistics show that Jordanians, Lebanese, Egyptians, Sudanese and Arabs were found involved in acts of terrorism against all Kashmiris regardless of their religion, gender and ethnicity.

In the previous administration in the USA, notably, during the presidency of Bill Clinton, Pakistan was placed on the list of suspected states that sponsored terrorism. This put Pakistani rulers on the defensive and forced them to change their modus of operation to conceal its direct involvement in Jammu and Kashmir. It was professed as the moral, political and material help to the Kashmiris in their fight for freedom from India's occupation. Financial and other assistance was thus channeled to Sundry Afghan Mujahideen Groups and in particular to two Pakistani organisations, i.e. Harkat-ul-Ansar (later renamed as the Harkat-ul - Mujahideen, subsequent to its being black listed as a terrorist organisation by the US),

and the Markaz Dawa Al-Irshad (Centre for Preaching), an extremist group active in Jammu and Kashmir, through its militants wing the Lashkar-e-Toiba (Army of the Pure).

Bin Laden has in the past indicated his willingness to take part in Jihad in Jammu and Kashmir but for Pakistan, which would not allow him to do so. In any case Bin Laden had publicly called for a Jihad against India, when he declared in Jalalabad, on 18 September 1999 that their biggest enemies were the USA and India, who should be targeted by using the best of their efforts. To Bin Laden's fanatic followers, the Sufi shrines that dot the Kashmir valley must be destroyed because Sufi tradition is un-Islamic.

Bin Laden represents the new face of terrorism, where rich individuals sponsor terrorist groups to achieve their own agenda. The US State Department highlighted this in its annual report, Patterns of Global Terrorism. The US officials have been quoted as saying that Islamic businessmen have been known to donate liberally to its cause. In many cases they are unaware as to what purpose their money is being used. Most of it does not go to rebuild Mosques in Bosnia or feed starving Muslims in civil war-torn Somalia. It is said in the official circles that a lot of it is going towards setting up of camps and support networks and to procure material for terrorist operations.

Combating Terrorism

India faces the major terrorist threats from Pakistan, and Pakistan sponsored acts of terrorism by various Jihadi groups located, trained, financed and operationally controlled by the successive Pakistani Rulers. Pakistan and some of its Islamic neighbouring

countries have been acting host to Pan Islamic fundamentalism, which has by now spread to all continents. It is more pronounced in Africa and Asia. The US and its allies from the Western world remain the major targets, including countries that co-operate with America and its allies in any endeavour. The fine network developed by Osama Bin Laden has shown to the world that such terrorist groups, though small in number, have been operating with stealth and secrecy. This was amply proved on 11 September 2001.

One way of combating terrorism has been as witnessed in the use of US's full military might supported by the Defence forces of the European Union against the Taliban in Afghanistan. Though Taliban rule in Afghanistan did come to an end, the operational command posts of Al Queda Chief and his key advisors remain intact. Pakistan, which professed itself as partner in USA's war against global terrorism, provided safe haven to the bulk of Jihad survivors in the remote Northern Frontiers areas, lying between Kashmir and Afghanistan.

In the 53 years since China came under the communist rule, the communist Government has been ruling the country with strict communist ideology. While it succeeded in subjugating Tibet in the South, the predominantly Muslim Western province of Xinjiang (Sinkiang) has been posing serious threats of breaking away from the Mainland. To neutralise the threat of Islamic Nationalists, China had promoted its relations with Pakistan and through Pakistan it tried to get closer to the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. China had been very eager to establish diplomatic and trade relations with

the Taliban Government in Kabul even as late as 1999. China had even signed an agreement with the then Taliban regime in 1998, who in turn promised not to help the Muslim separatists in Xinjiang (Sinkiang). During the same period, China undertook to train Taliban pilots to fly aircraft in Jalalabad. The Chinese presence in the South of Pamirs, for the first time, further strengthened Pakistan's role in Afghanistan. In fact, China's role in Afghanistan lends credence to the view that China perceives this as another opportunity to keep India and Pakistan "engaged". According to Mr. Surya Gangadharan, a former Ambassador to Pakistan, Islamabad is probably the lynchpin of Beijing's grand strategy for regional security in the 21st Century.

Israeli Policy of Counter Terrorism

India could benefit from the study of Israel's policy of counter terrorism. The state of Israel has faced two major and ever increasing threats since its creation. The first of these is the general conventional war and the second is the threat of international terrorism. Terrorist attacks against Israel originated in the early 50's in the form of illegal infiltration by Palestinian refugees from the neighbouring Arab states. The initial Israel reaction was to turn to United Nations but this had virtually no effect on infiltration and acts of terrorism. The principal reason was that the frontline Arab State had no interest whatsoever in stopping the Palestinians from crossing into Israel. Faced with this type of situation, Israel resorted to reprisal raids, which exemplified co-coercive diplomacy intended to affect the opponent's will rather than impose a military solution. This policy however had an escalatory effect. Instead of countering poorly trained civilians, Israel

began to confront highly trained commandos. This resulted in a change in Israeli strategy; it was one of massive retaliation i.e. a deliberate disproportion between Arab provocation and Israeli response as a means of compelling Arab Government to take a firm measure against Palestinian infiltration.

In early 1953, Unit 101, a commando formation of 50 known - uniformed men - was created, with the sole purpose of carrying out intense sabotage on the Arab side of the border. The message was not lost upon the frontline Arab States. After a number of reprisals the governments of the Arab states hastened to deploy additional forces astride the Armistice Demarcation Line (ADL). The order given was not to pose a threat to Israel but to shoot at site anyone who tried to cross the ADL. Naturally there was a sharp decrease in the terrorist activities in Israel by Arabs crossing from the states neighbouring Israel.

The growth of Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO) in the last three decades is well known. When air piracy became a major weapon of terrorism, Israelis developed its counter tactics. The Entebbe Operation is a classic example of offensive action against hijacking. In the eyes of Islamic terrorists, the USA came to be recognised as the promoter of Israel and hence the Americans too became the targets of the Islamic terrorists, even though the USA was accepted as the power to mediate in an effort to bring peace to the Middle East. Despite the fact that the establishment of the Palestinian State has been accepted and approved by the United Nations, the Fidayeen have not ceased to bleed Israel with its suicide attacks on soft Israeli targets, inviting massive military retaliation, which has virtually destroyed the developing Palestine State.

It is worth noting that the use of terrorism by the PLO was not a strategic but a tactical proposition whose purpose was to gain and enhance international recognition, so that the Palestinian issue remains on the international agenda. Today, the PLO has achieved recognition from the state of Israel, and in return Yasser Arafat has renounced terrorism.⁶ It is still not too late for India to adopt an offensive policy towards cross border terrorism, which has been bleeding India during the last two decades.

India has to formulate its own policy of combating terrorism, which will continue to threaten our national security. Our understanding of national security must be future-oriented, i.e. anticipate hostile intentions that threaten our state, society and value system, pragmatically assess adversary's intentions, and devise ways and means to check them. This requires an effective and operationally functional, permanent, institution with professionals in the field of external, and internal security parameters heading such a body. Only persons of proven experience should be nominated to such a body. The present arrangement of the National Security Council (NSC) appears to be an ad-hoc one and needs to be professionalised to ensure that the tools to combat terrorism can be properly re-organised, trained and effectively used.

Suggested Course of Action

The Central Government must ensure that national security management of India provides integrated thinking and co-ordinated application of the political, military, diplomatic, scientific and technological resources of the state to protect and promote the national security goals and objectives. The NSC

should be responsible for external security, security threats involving Atomic energy, Space and high technology, trends in the world economy and economic security threats. In addition, it should act as a watchdog for internal security, patterns of alienation emerging in the country, specially those with social, communal or religious dimensions, trans-border crimes and Intelligence co-ordination, and most important, the tasking of the various agencies available in the country. International Terrorism has shifted from the Middle East to our neighbourhood. India has a major stake in the reorganisation and re-establishment of the new Afghanistan. It is also in India's interest to build up its leverages by co-ordinating its Afghan policy with Iran and the Central Asian States.

It is high time that India rethinks her decade long policy of only reacting to Pakistani provocation in Kashmir. The passive policy of defending Indian territory is bleeding this country economically because the initiative and the element of surprise always remains with the adversary. There is a need to rethink ways to meet the challenge posed by Pakistan's covert War. Added to this is the need for intensive drive towards Pakistan's political and diplomatic isolation. The winning of American confidence in favour of India is a valuable counter to China and should be pursued to its logical conclusion.

It would be relevant for India to probe China's interest and intention in the newly liberated Afghanistan under President Karzai. At bilateral level, India should step up efforts to build economic linkages with China, particularly the opening of land routes into Tibet. However, it may be in the interest of the USA to use India militarily as a valuable

counter to China, but India must make attempts to rebuild its traditional cultural and economic ties with China.

India with the ASEAN should contribute to the development of strong economic ties as counter to the growth of Islamic insurgency in South East Asia. Of the 10 members of ASEAN, three (Malaysia, Indonesia, and Brunei) are Muslim majority states. Six are Buddhist (Myanmar, Thailand, Singapore, Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia). And one state - Philippines - is Christian but it has a sizeable Muslim population as well. Thus, there are 250 million Muslims in South East Asia alone. The Islamic insurgents in ASEAN countries have developed links with Bin Laden and Al Queda thus creating new fears of Islamic terrorism in the entire region.

Recently the ASEAN has adopted an 'anti -terrorism' pact with the USA pledging total support. American involvement in anti-terrorism has naturally worried many people. China fears that the US may be making attempts to return to South East Asia in full force and therefore the initiative of advocating free trade regime of 2 billion people, thus submerging all contradiction in the area within this vast sea of apparent unity. However India must consider its national interest to combat both Islamic fundamentalism and terrorism, as also Chinese hegemony. India, therefore, should align with the USA and welcome an increased presence of America in the region.

The government of India has spent billions of Rupees in raising and maintaining its Defence Forces and Central Police Organisations. While our Armed Forces are fully trained and equipped to fight against any conventional external threat, its employment in internal security matters over a prolonged period is at the cost of its

operational efficiency in performance of its primary task. Correspondingly, central police organisations like the Border Security Force (BSF), the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF), the Indo Tibetan Border Police (ITBP), and the Assam Rifles were specifically created by an act of Parliament to combat threats to internal security. The success of both types of forces is dependent on efficient intelligence system, employed for the external and internal intelligence. The successive Central Governments at New Delhi have shown poor judgement in use of the resources available within the country. The height of terrorist threat to the country was when the very force that was screened and specially selected to protect the Prime Minister failed to save her from the assassin's bullets, in her own home.

India now has a third force in the National Security Guard (NSG). This force was created by an act of Parliament to give it a character totally different from the Defence Forces and the Central Police Organisation (CPO). The best of manpower from the Army and the CPOs were specially selected and trained to combat terrorism. However, this force has remained under-utilised in its primary task, due to the misplaced belief of the government that the NSG should remain under the overall control of the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA); and its key appointments in the hands of IPS officers, who lack the comprehension and training in the effective employment of this force.

The policy makers who are party to raising of such special forces, lack the vision and understanding to use these forces in accordance with their capability. This brings out the need for establishment of a Joint Command Centre comprising officers with

proven professional standing and trained in integrated employment of the entire national resources. The Joint Command Centre should operate under the Cabinet Secretariat for providing inputs and operational plan to the National Security Council. The absence of such a body has been the prime cause for the failure in combating terrorism in the country in general and in the state of Jammu and Kashmir in particular.

Law enforcement in India has not responded adequately to the reality of growing threat of terrorism by re-structuring the various complements of police forces. It is important that the citizens should be able to distinguish the policemen from the soldiers. To combat terrorism, the police would have to hone their ability to carry out three law enforcement functions : -

- (a) Intelligence gathering.
- (b) Protection against and prevention of terrorist attacks.
- (c) Capability to implement counter terrorist operations.

The Indian Police could benefit a great deal if they were to adopt the concept of the British Police, specially in the tasks of combating terrorism so that the anti-terrorist division of the Central and State Police receive common training, motivation and employment.

Conclusion

Terrorism is one of the most critical and complex problems facing democratic Governments today. Its irrational violence threatens the very fibre of democratic stability, while effective countermeasures pose a

philosophical dilemma. If governments yield to terrorist demands, they may be perceived as inept. Conversely, if government overreacts legislatively, administratively or militarily, they risk the suppression of civil liberties, that are democracy's basic tenets. The making of the NSC as an effective institution, bringing about attitudinal changes, setting up a planning structure and organising the training of those inducted in such a body, is of paramount importance to the Government of India to combat threats of terrorism.

The Government has recognised the seriousness of the threat of terrorism and has responded with determination. It has also struggled to balance the importance of civil rights with the right of protection from terrorist attacks. It has enacted adequate legislation, has become a signatory to international anti-terrorist legislation and international terrorism conventions. Though some re-organisation in the police force was adopted in the post militancy period in the State of Punjab in the 1980's, the regional police forces still suffer from lack of adequate training to counter terrorist activities in their areas of responsibilities. Leave aside combating insurgency or terrorism, the state police force in India is generally found to be partisan and clannish. Otherwise why should situations like the Gujarat riots take place? There is a crying need for changing the very image of police in India. And, one of the effective methods of overhauling the image of CPO and state police is by adopting lateral induction of trained manpower from the armed forces into the CPO's. Such a step will inject an element of esteem and pride within the police force - something which the society has always heaped on the Defence personnel.

Complementary to efficient police is the intelligence agencies who have to be more professional and in step with the most advanced nations of the world. The best material from the armed forces, police and other technical professions should be integrated in the intelligence and counter intelligence organisations of the country. Similarly, there is a need for greater integration of Defence with diplomacy when it comes to seeking international support to our major territorial disputes both on the land and sea frontiers of India.

Though the country has achieved adequate economic prosperity in agriculture and Industry, economic gains do get neutralised due to myopic vision, petty squabbling, greed and dishonesty in the government, leaving the population condemned to exploitation, poverty and "vote bank" of the politicians. Human development, better health and education and improvement in the quality of life and fulfillment of aspirations have all eluded the vast human resources of India. If security challenges to the country have to be conquered, greater stress has to be laid on human security - in the fields of education, health, nutrition and family planning. The population of India is apparently slated to increase to a whopping 1535 million by 2050, followed by China with 1517 million and Pakistan at 357 million.⁹ If India has to avert this demographic imbalance, great maturity and vision is required from the government and the leadership to prevent the catastrophic loss that India would suffer.

Notes

1. MJ Akbar, *India: The Seige Within- Challenges to a Nation's Unity*, p.9.
2. Ibid, pp. 17-18 and 223-250.
3. Jaswant Singh, National Security: An Outline of our Concern, pp 13-17.
4. S.Gangadharan, "Recent Developments in Afghanistan: Their Impact on India", *United Service Institution of India Occasional Paper* 1/1999, pp 25, 28-33 and 36-39.
5. Menon , "Islamic Radicalism in South East Asia", *The Tribune*, 9 August 2002.
6. Dr. Jawaid Iqbal, "Israeli Policy of Counter Terrorism". A Paper presented at a National Security Seminar on " International Terrorism & State Policy", 29 March 1994.
7. K Subrahmanyam, "Challenges to Indian Security", *USI Journal* , Oct-Dec 2000.
8. Peter J Sacopolos, "Terrorism in Britain: Threat, Reality, Response" *Terrorism - An International Journal*, Volume 12, Number 3, 1989.
9. Lt Gen Satish Nambiar, PVSM, AVSM, VrC (Retd), "India and the World Strategic Environment", *USI Journal*, Oct-Dec 1998.

CHAIRMAN'S REMARKS

May I now request Mr Kanwar Sandhu to present his paper. He has been the Resident Editor of Hindustan Times for the last three years in Chandigarh. Prior to this he was the Resident Editor of the Indian Express for six years. He has also worked for India Today for a number of years. He specialises in Defence and security affairs.

He was doing a programme with the Arms Control and Disarmament centre of the University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign, USA for six months in 1991-1992. He has travelled widely and has been to Pakistan many times. He is one of the few Indian journalists who has visited Pakistan Occupied Kashmir several times.

FIRST SESSION : FOURTH PAPER

SHRI KANWAR SANDHU

It is doubtful whether the security challenges of India could be divided into external and internal aspects, as has been done for the purpose of this Seminar, especially in today's context. The other day, I was reading General Shankar Roy Chowdhury's interesting book "Officially At Peace", where he has described the present state we are in very aptly as 'hot peace.'

It is apparent that externally supported separatist movements pose a big threat to external and internal security. Of course if one goes into the genesis of the separatist movements, much of the blame for their origin would lie on the lop-sided domestic, political and administrative policies. Things being what they are, it is apparent that there is a clear linkage of proxy war sponsored by Pakistan in Jammu and Kashmir with insurgency and violence in the North East and elsewhere. Even other agencies like Bangladesh's Directorate General of Field Intelligence are also in the fray. In Nepal, the activities of the Maoists, who are wanting the 1950 Indo-Nepal treaty to be abrogated, are well known. In fact there is evidence that the Maoists are interested in North Bengal as an area where they could spread their influence. The externally supported low intensity conflicts have redefined the traditional perception of both external and internal threats.

Security Environment Around India

In the West we have Pakistan and Afghanistan. We have an adversarial relationship with Pakistan, borne out of historical, ethnic and ideological differences.

With Afghanistan, we have an uncertain relationship due to a certain instability in the governments there. In the East, we have Bangladesh and Myanmar; the relations are uncertain due to recurrence of irritants from time to time. In the North we have China with whom we have an uncertain relationship bordering on the adversarial because of:

- (a) Pending border dispute.
- (b) China's hegemonistic designs in the region, particularly in Tibet.
- (c) Gaining clout vis-a-vis the US, Russia and others in the region.

In South, we have Sri Lanka. We also have a long coastline, with a lot of island territories. With Sri Lanka too there is uncertainty due to an inherent ethnic conflict of interest between India and Sri Lanka and also because of Sri Lanka's dependence on others, including Pakistan for weapons. India is constantly on guard against efforts to encroach upon India's maritime rights by the US, Russia, China, and Pakistan in the area.

Challenges to Indian security

The adversarial and uncertain security environment around us poses a direct threat to our security. What adds to the threat is the nature of the porous borders:

- (a) Undefined borders in North Jammu and Kashmir - beyond NJ 9842, which has resulted in conflict on Siachen Glacier.

(b) The Line of Control in most parts of Jammu and Kashmir - nearly 800 km, starting from plains of Jammu region and going North.

(c) International borders in Punjab, Rajasthan and Gujarat.

(d) Disputed boundary with China along Line of Actual Control (LAC).

(e) Disputes on boundary with Bangladesh and Myanmar.

Though troops are deployed at various places, the peculiar nature of the border does not allow for physical sealing of the borders. Nor do we have the funds to equip ourselves with high-tech equipment. Mile to mile deployment weakens our capability to meet external challenges as conventional training takes a beating. Then there is the problem of demographic changes that unchecked infiltration is creating. This is happening in many states, including Assam. This is bound to have long-term security implications - internal and external.

Meeting the Challenges

On several occasions India's resolve has been tested. It must be clearly assessed as to what else needs to be done to meet the mounting challenges to Indian security? *First* of all we need to take certain internal measures against demographic changes that are taking place due to migration from across our borders. We need to fence the border wherever possible; it made a marked difference in Punjab at the time of terrorism in the state. Besides physical sealing of border, we need to make it mandatory for every citizen to have a social security number for getting a job in government and private

sector. Besides, the voter I-card system should be implemented in letter and spirit and updated annually. The obvious alibi will be that this is physically not possible. I don't buy this - if we can't ensure an I-card for every citizen, how can we ensure the safety of every citizen? Here again, we will have to adopt a pragmatic policy and have a current date as the cut off date.

Secondly, there is need for a National Security Policy. The policy articulated over a time, which is the military strategy in conformity with overall government policies, is too vague. The national security policy has to take into account two separate aspects - diplomatic, political and the military. The 'operational directives' that the government gives to the Service Chiefs from time to time is not enough; national security policy has to be a perfect amalgamation of the above-mentioned two aspects. The Ministry of Defence prepares what is known as Strategic and Technological Environment Assessment. This is an inter-ministerial multi-disciplinary study undertaken under the aegis of the Director General of Defence Planning (DGDPS) with representatives of various ministries. But the DGDPS has lost much of its sheen over the years; the people posted there are only marking time and most of them do not even have stable tenures for any worthwhile study and analysis.

My suggestion is that we require a clear national security policy, which could change with the times. In this, our national security concerns should drive our foreign policy. This was so in case of the US and even Pakistan in Afghanistan. The US, for example, has a National Security Doctrine and nearer home, even China reportedly has a National Security Policy.

Thirdly, we need a 'one by one' approach. This in fact has been the Chinese policy. Our constant endeavour has been to deal with all our problems and our adversaries at one time. This is not practical and also not cost effective. It stretches our military beyond its efficacy levels. Of the myriad of problems that we face, we need to prioritise:

(a) Our main adversary is Pakistan. While we deal with it, we could engage countries like China and Afghanistan in a dialogue which are issue-based. For example, we could enter into talks with China, Afghanistan and other Central Asian Republics on issues of mutual interest. This in the long term could slowly drive a wedge between Pakistan and China. But unless we ensure that Hindu fundamentalism does not raise its head within the country, whatever gains we hope for will be offset. Similarly, we need to have greater interaction with our neighbours, particularly Bangladesh and Srilanka. With both, we need to allay fears of India harbouring any hegemonistic designs. These are the two countries Pakistan has been trying to woo; General Pervez Musharraf had made a visit to these two countries in order to reinforce Pakistan's relationship.

(b) Our second priority should be to resolve boundary and other differences with Bangladesh.

Fourthly, giving top priority to Pakistan will mean being prepared to have focus on Jammu and Kashmir. It has become a national hobby to blame Pakistan on Jammu and Kashmir and to keep harping on the fact that Jammu and Kashmir is an integral part of India. To be honest, on Jammu and

Kashmir, what was historically a strong case, has been weakened beyond recognition and today, it would require tremendous effort in every possible way to talk from the position of strength.

(a) The Jammu and Kashmir policy would have to be multi-pronged. The politically strong would launch an all out effort to gain people's confidence, politically and administratively. This will have to go beyond rhetoric and will have to be based on sound principles which are also pragmatic. Also on fair play. Or else it would isolate us globally. That is what is gradually happening to Israel. Many people suggest the Israel model. I have no hesitation in saying that the Israel model is a faulty model to adopt. We need to formulate our own model. Moreover, Israel has the US to back it.

(b) Infiltration would have to be stopped.

Fifthly, a higher defence organisation is required. It is now an established fact that long term higher planning in defence has been erratic. An integrated civil-defence organisation is also required. Many countries have such an organisation. After much dithering, a Chief of Defence Staff system has been agreed to, and it is progressing gradually. This in fact needs to be speeded up and given a concrete shape.

Sixthly, there is a need to indigenise and modernise. We need to learn from China on its 'four modernisations'. We need to go into what we have actually achieved in DRDO factories and laboratories. This is important since we cannot afford to spare even four per cent of our Gross National Product for the Defence budget.

Seventhly, a pro-active approach is a must. Since Partition, we have followed a somewhat reactive policy. This means that we continue to adopt a passive approach till our existence is threatened. Then of course we react with full force. Apparently, this policy has not paid off, for Pakistan continues with its adventurism in Jammu and Kashmir and elsewhere. Maybe we should have a declared pro-active policy that any violation would be met with greater volition. This would be different from the so-called 'forward policy' that we followed in 1962 with China. The pro-active policy is to react in a pre-emptive manner so that we do not continue to lose men and material. This policy would help do away with the need to station troops in many places, including Siachen and Kargil, which stems out of the demand to hold every inch of the territory. We could then perhaps spend more on ground sensors and airborne early warning systems to monitor the borders for a quick and effective riposte. The effect of adopting a pro-active policy would be manifold:

(a) The National Security Doctrine would change drastically.

(b) The nuclear doctrine of 'no first use' will need to be modified to include: No First Use against civilians; and, provision for preemptive strikes to stall nuclear attack.

(c) The three Services will undergo a complete change in military doctrinal planning. This will also have a bearing on the equipment and training down the line.

(d) A change in peoples' mind set. A pro-active policy takes its toll, particularly along the border. The people will have to be prepared for it.

To sum up, India has an adversarial neighbourhood with porous boundaries that allow inimical forces to support internal disturbances. To counter these challenges, we need a well defined national security policy dictated by our security concerns, proper prioritisation of threats to our security, a well laid out higher security apparatus and a no-nonsense pro-active approach.

CHAIRMAN'S REMARKS

While going through the papers of the panelists I was struck by the fact that we were not just talking about threat perceptions, need for proper policies towards our neighbours on security matters and other issues but there seemed to be a fair amount of writing on our attitudes and apparatus at the highest level. As far as China is concerned, although a major war with them in the foreseeable future is unlikely and we should continue to engage China, one can nevertheless not ignore the territorial threat across the Line of Actual Control or the long term challenges from China. The panelists have clearly brought this out, in their presentations. Till the delineation of the LAC is agreed to, India should be cautious because the nibbling of the area between our respective perceptions of line of control is possible. Although we have talked about it in the 1996 agreement - in between lies the area where encroachments can take place from both sides. The Chinese still refuse to accept Sikkim as our territory; the Chinese Vice Foreign Minister has recently stated that China's foreign policy towards India is independent of its strategic relations with Pakistan. During our discussions when we agreed to visit each other's areas, their officers refused to visit Ladakh due to Pakistan's claim on J & K.

To avoid being coerced into accepting Chinese policies that affect us adversely, like its strategic relations with Pakistan, we should, while continuing to engage China, make haste with our economic and Defence capabilities. This means development of the infrastructures in our areas bordering China as also our strategic weapons capabilities.

Regarding Pakistan and Jehadi terrorism threats, in my opinion, Pakistan under the Army rule will remain hostile to India and perpetuate cross border terrorism. Pakistan, on some issue or the other, apart from the J & K, would trouble India for a long time. Pakistan will remain politically unstable. Under these circumstances we need to be clear about our short, medium and long term interests. Do we desire a politically and economically stable Pakistan or a split and weak Pakistan. It is not yet clear. In the short and medium term, the policy should be to revive and strengthen the polity in Pakistan and at the same time minimise the role and influence of the Pak Army. Opinion is divided on this. During the Agra Summit, instead of it being a working visit, Musharraf was given a welcome that was exploited to the hilt by him. Personally, I feel that no agreement can be signed with the military government in Pakistan. There is a need to improve the capability of the Armed Forces and that of our nuclear weapons to make them more credible, and undertake both defensive and offensive measures. While countering terrorism, use has to be made of the post 11 September 2001 anti terrorism environment, including the UN Security Council Resolution 1373, which is very comprehensive. It states that action should be taken by the UN against anyone supporting such terrorist activities. A Department of counter terrorism should be established in the Ministry of Home Affairs. At the moment far too many agencies are dealing with this - the Ministry of Home Affairs, Prime Minister's Office and so on - and there is a lack of coordination. There is also a need to work out and implement a

sophisticated psy-war strategy. In the long run the goal should be to rejuvenate active democracy in Pakistan and proceed beyond Lahore process.

An obsession and overwhelming engagement with Pakistan is counter productive. It lowers our status in the region and in the world. While engaging Pakistan, there is a need to avoid neglect of our relations, particularly with SAARC, ASEAN and other countries. As far as nuclear policies are concerned, there is a need for greater assurance and not just the confidence of our scientists. The military needs to develop competence in handling nukes. There is a need to check if our systems would respond properly. And, to establish a credible nuclear deterrent a nuclear triad, Armed Tracked Vehicle (ATV), Agni II and III capabilities, have to be expedited in national interest despite pressure from the US or other countries. So while dialogues can go on, national interests cannot be compromised.

The presenters of papers have expressed their lament regarding Indian attitude towards security, very explicitly. Strategic culture is defined as the ability of the people and society to generate power, to have 'will' and ability for a full and effective employment in that power. Unfortunately, we have always been a country that is accommodative and forgiving, internalised, fixated with curbing within rather than combating the external. We have not learnt lessons from history. The endeavour should now be to avoid the armed forces getting sidelined with little say in decision making, what with a gradual erosion in their social status with every coming year, with soldiers' sacrifices forgotten in due course and where Generals are supposed to win wars but not

speak about Defence capabilities. A country where any well to do person has not seen war or is not willing to send his child to serve the nation in the Defence Services, it is a wonderment how that country can ever become strategically proactive. We need to educate and spread national security consciousness. It is only then that attitudes will change. This is a long term concern.

Regarding national security and defence policy, nobody in India knows what is our defence policy. A vague statement made by the former Prime Minister Narasimha Rao in 1985 mentioned that a Defence policy should predicate itself to the requirements of the international strategic environment. It should take into account our internal, political and economic compulsions.

At the Forces Headquarters there is one policy statement which was signed by R Venkataraman when he was the Defence Minister. The Defence policies and postures is a dynamic process and must be revised frequently if they are to remain current. Over the years several drafts on threat perceptions and policies have been sent to the Ministry of Defence; but none got approved. One got the impression that the political leadership and their civilian advisors in the MoD are either not interested or not willing to sign such a policy. Written policies make people accountable. Maybe that is what is avoided. In the absence of any articulated policy, India has come to be termed a status quo and a reactive nation in security matters. With a history of reactive attitude, the ground is laid for Kargil type initiative by the adversary. People inquire why did Kargil happen? But then why did the 1965 Indo-Pak War happen? Before 4 September 1965, when the International Border was crossed, the same

situation was witnessed in Akhnoor, Naushera, Rajouri and Poonch areas. Also, under Operation Gibraltar the Pakistanis had entered Indian territory and were sitting on many of our features. They had attacked Akhnoor alongside. Hence, one does agree with one of the speakers that one cannot stop anybody on the line because there is no line on the border. But there are not many who realise that the main cause of Kargil is the initiative taken by somebody. It is not a matter of why were we not able to stop them. Later we were able to not only stop but even undo it. There is a need to articulate national security and defence review; the US does it every three years, in writing.

Regarding military capabilities and organisations, there is a need to improve Defence capabilities and combat ratio with Pakistan and China. Notwithstanding all the purchases that have been done by India, the combat ratio has been deteriorating consistently, especially so since the 1971

Indo-Pak War. Budgets have taken good care of the maintenance requirements but not much to enhance combat ratio. We live in a fast changing strategic environment. The fast changing warfare technology and geopolitical environment requires more frequent review of strategy, tactics and security organisations. We should review the requirement of weapons, equipment and other force multipliers to meet the new combat requirements. Anything that was considered in one of the plans earlier needs to be reviewed again before going in for its implementation. Earlier, military doctrinal reviews were done once in two or three decades. Now they are needed every four or five years. Unfortunately we have Service-specific doctrine but no Defence doctrine. However, recently there has been a comprehensive security review by the Group of Ministers (known popularly as the GOM). It is hoped that its implementation in letter and spirit is undertaken expeditiously.

DISCUSSIONS

Lieutenant General Deepinder Singh

A pertinent point was made regarding focusing on one area at a time. And the primary focus must be on Pakistan. The challenge is now on how to negotiate with the Americans, even manage them. Secondly, there was a reference made to Afghanistan. In 1971, when relations with Afghanistan were close, numerous efforts were made to persuade Afghanistan to move some troops up to the Durand Line so that at least one division of Pakistan could be tied up. This suggestion was refused. If that was the situation then, it is really doubtful what better could emerge in the present circumstances. Thirdly, it is accepted that insurgency, and terrorism has its genesis in misgovernance. We have suffered insurgency right from 1956, even earlier. Surprisingly, there is no White Paper or inquiry going into the reasons for the rise of insurgency developing into terrorism and hold the guilty accountable. The Media needs to press this matter, insist on a White Paper on these problems, repeatedly if necessary. At the moment there is no accountability. Once a White Paper is insisted upon, matters may improve.

Shri Kanwar Sandhu

On the matter of dealing with and adjusting to the sensibilities of the United States, we need to be very careful about fundamentalism raising its head in India because then India could face the danger of being equated with countries like Pakistan. The Gujarat riots are instance of national shame that could be exploited vis a vis the

United States. There have been 'White Paper' in some cases but these were politically motivated. For instance there was a White Paper on Punjab after Operation Blue Star. However, it is alleged that the blame was laid on someone else for the happenings. May be a White Paper brought out by the government of that particular time, with inputs from non government officials would be of some use.

Major General Rajinder Nath

In 1978, an Afghanistan Army delegation headed by a Lieutenant general and two Major Generals visited India for discussions. The head of the delegation put a question as to why India stopped fighting on the Western Sector after Bangladesh surrendered. In his opinion, if it had been continued for a little while more, Afghanistan would have also joined in. This is so because they do not accept the present boundary line between Afghanistan and Pakistan. Views of countries change according to circumstances and national priorities. As of now, Afghanistan has sought help from India and India has extended it. This opportunity may be used by India to win over the Afghans or Pathans.

General V P Malik

There has even been a case where an Army officer from Afghanistan under training in India mentioned that if India were to attack Pakistan, the Afghans would shake hands with us. India has had a consistent policy of supporting the Northern Alliance. This has paid off well.

Lieutenant General SS Brar

We seem to have thrown the ball in the court of the politicians. While one may agree to the criticism for indecision, wrong decisions, and lack of a national security policy, it is debatable if one were to be a Defence Minister, how would one feel about the answers to the questions raised. Some of the most needed provisions are ignored and of course there is too much of politicking involved.

General V P Malik

All those who were in authority at that highest level had taken up these issues. That is where our past culture and ethos come in. This is the reason I have lamented about the isolation of the military. Almost every Chief has taken this issue up. In the matter regarding crossing the Line of Control, we seem to be taking the credit for not crossing it. This seems to have set a very wrong precedence. A majority part of the Army is deployed in J and K and on the borders and we are proclaiming to one and all our intention not to cross the Line of Control, leave alone the International Border.

We have to accept the fact that the Armed Forces are an instrument of the Government. So the Chief of the Army Staff will have to either accept the laid down policy or resign. He has only two options at that stage. During the Kargil war, there was a policy laid down to which I had agreed to. And, that policy was that we will not cross the border. We may have had to cross the border. I had requested the Prime Minister not to repeat the statement about our intention not to cross the border. Suppose the Armed Forces would not have been in a

position to do what the Prime Minister wished the forces to do? What would have been the latter's response if the Forces were to say that the border would be crossed now? Repetition of the statement did stop after that. In the ultimate analysis, it must be noted that matters are debated, and to that I stand by the fact that the military must obey the orders of the political leadership or resign.

Lieutenant General K S Gill

You firmly believed that the advice tendered to the Prime Minister was in national interest. In such circumstances, when a Chief of the Army Staff believes that his advice to the PM is in national interest, he must stand up to it. Further, the civilians are not as educated on Defence matters as the people in the Forces are.

General V P Malik

What is the ultimate aim of war? It is not to capture territories; it is to put the other side in a disadvantageous position, politically. And this we achieved in the Kargil conflict. One is unsure of the results, if the war had been escalated. Because then the political and consequently the military's aim would have been different. The political and military aim was restricted to Kargil at that time and it was a success, politically and militarily.

The Jammu and Kashmir problem in fact can be traced to the British colonial rule in India. The British wished the State of Jammu and Kashmir to join Pakistan for strategic reasons, for their own purposes and for the security of Pakistan. Over a period of time, Pakistan leadership has come to believe that there is no space between nuclear deterrence threshold and the adoption of

terrorism and proxy war as a state policy. There is no space for conventional superiority either. The dilemma now is on how to create this space.

Major General Rajendra Nath

The Pakistani assumption is that with its nuclear capability they could put India against the wall without fear of retribution. But we in India feel that enough space is available between the nuclear approach on one side and proxy war on the other. We must be able to utilise the forces, particularly the Army and the Air Force, for desired effect by limited action. Proxy war has to be countered by conventional force being employed for undertaking punitive action.

General V P Malik

I have been openly stating the availability of space. And, if Pakistan did not believe in that space why it would have such large conventional forces? So what they say is quite contrary to the ground reality. In Kargil War itself this space was visible.

Lieutenant General Thakur K S Lundra

From the days when the (former) Soviet Union was termed as the 'evil empire' by the Americans, the US now emphasises that Russia is not an enemy. The query is then who is the enemy? In Taiwan, at the behest of the Americans, the Taiwan issue is being used to trigger the Chinese. The foreign policy of our northern neighbour Nepal needs to be reviewed because our country stands 800 kms West to East along our northern borders common to Tibet. It is the sole Hindu kingdom that we have in the world. The problems that we have with Nepal are the boundary dispute

on its western borders; also the river issue - there are about eleven rivers that come down and flow into the Ganges.

Further, none of the speakers seem to have dwelt on Nepal, Australia, Sri Lanka, Bangla Desh and Myanmar. Hence there has been no reference to any threats to the Andaman and Nicobar Islands. They are sparsely populated and an ideal ground for terrorism and narco trafficking. While dealing with the security challenges, the importance of Israel has been overlooked too. If we were to befriend Israel, we may achieve something in our security endeavours.

Geopolitical threats have been discussed, but not the threats from trans national forces. Pakistan's ISI is controlling 40 per cent of the world's drug market, i.e \$ 200 billion.

As a war against India is difficult to win, Pakistan resorts to low intensity conflicts; the reason for insurgency is dissatisfaction and the cause for dissatisfaction is rampant corruption in India's political system. Are we actually in a position to go in for a proactive policy? A reference was made to the para military forces. When the war situation develops, it becomes the responsibility of the Armed Forces and not that of the para military forces.

Colonel D P Thapar

I wish to refer to the aims of Pakistan. It is basically historic and in the psyche of Pakistan. Their aim does not seem to be just Kashmir but entire India and probably make it an Islamic state. Islamic fundamentalism, in fact, is based on making

the world an Islamic entity. Further, there has been a mistrust between the Defence and the political leadership that has been reinforced by the military rule in our neighbourhood. Something has to be done about this.

Corruption is another ugly aspect. It is a highly profitable business and it is openly indulged in. One wonders what sort of economy this country would have in these circumstances.

Shri K N Singh

Despite so many years having gone by after the 1962 Sino-Indian War, the Henderson Brookes Report has not been publicized. May I have the reason for this?

General V P Malik

It did come up for consideration during my time, but the situation was not conducive for the release of the report, what with talks about China being 'enemy number one' and all the media hype that the media gave to this aspect. But all officers at the Army Headquarters when posted to PSO appointments should read that report.

Major General K S Bajura

This is a question for Kanwar Sandhu. Can the media play a proactive role in educating the politicians of this country and creating a lobby in support of the feature that what the Defence people think may be the right approach.

Shri Kanwar Sandhu

The media can play a greater role, but even then a lot of media men may not be qualified on sensitive matters such as security affairs of this nation. There are very few in the media who understand matters military. This can be achieved if there is greater training for the media people on security matters.

A reference was made that the Israel model should be followed. May be that is not the right, specially in light of the neighbourhood we have; it could lead to further isolation. Further, most of Israeli policies are also not successful. There are many instances of human bombs in that region. Most of it is overlooked by the US because of their support for Israel, but I am not sure whether India would get that kind of support.

On the question raised by Col Bhullar as to whether India is to be blamed for the hostile neighbourhood around us. In certain cases we do need to do some introspection, especially in the case of Bangladesh. But the hostility vis a vis Pakistan and the uncertain relations with Sri Lanka, these have historical, ideological and ethnic basis. So we may not be at fault regarding all matters.

General V P Malik

I must thank the panelists for their exceptional presentations. I greatly appreciate all for cooperating and making it such a lively debate.

INTERNAL CHALLENGES AND RESPONSES

AFTERNOON SESSION

Chairman : Lieutenant General Vijay Oberoi, PVSM, AVSM, VSM (Retd)

First Paper : Shri Ram S Varma, IAS (Retd)

Second Paper : Colonel PK Vasudeva (Retd)

Third Paper : Shri G V Gupta, IAS (Retd)

Fourth Paper : Shri Baljit Rai, IPS (Retd)

Discussions

**LIEUTENANT GENERAL VIJAY OBEROI, PVSM, AVSM, VSM (RETD)
CHAIRMAN**

The subject of the Second Session is 'Internal Challenges and Responses'. This session is being chaired by me in the absence of Shri A N Mathur, who could not chair this session due to some official engagements.

External and internal threats are enmeshed to a large extent. However, unless we seriously dwell on the internal challenges, we may be missing out on some important facets of security. The 'internal' aspects are similar to 'operations' and 'logistics'. During discussions, if two and a half hours are spent on operations, attempts are made to cover logistics in thirty minutes. This is incorrect. With great effort I have allocated the same amount of time to internal challenges as I did for the External challenges.

India's security problems arise from a combination of several factors but these can be grouped under three categories: -

(a) *Ethnic and Religious Fundamentalism*. This has partly gained ground due to encouragement by vested interests. This affects the very root of the Indian society dependant as it is on multi cultural, multi-lingual and multi ethnic ethos, with secularism acting as the bonding agent. Fundamentalism, thus, strikes at the very fabric of the Indian society.

(b) *Economic Growth*. India has made progress in many spheres. But there have been certain flaws. Economic growth has led to greater aspirations; and in certain cases it has also resulted

in discontentment, when aspirations are not met.

(c) *The Pulls of Subnationalism*. These are strong due to regional disparities and uneven development. The resulting discontent has been assiduously manipulated by our hostile neighbours as also by anti nationalist groups in India. The line between external and internal security environment has blurred. These can merge into a major threat without much warning.

(d) *Lack of Economic Development and uncontrolled population explosion* in neighbouring countries has resulted in trans-border migration into India, which continues unabated. Vested interests in our country encourage this, for short term gains, such as creation of vote banks. It has created severe socio-economic tensions. Issues such as 'Gorkhaland' and 'Bodoland' and organisations like the 'Peoples War Group', the 'Mao Communist Army' and the 'Kampatpuri Liberation Organisation' are creating internal imbalances. India's internal problems are further exacerbated by the erosion of moral values and inept governance in many states. Such a situation exposes India to the threats of subversion, sabotage and exploitation.

In this session, the first presentation is by Shri Ram Varma of the Indian Administrative Service, who retired as the

Chief Secretary, Haryana about two years back. I had the privilege of serving in Chandimandir at the time when he was the Chief Secretary. Having done post graduation from the Allahabad University, he joined the IAS, Punjab Cadre in 1964. In 1966 he joined the Haryana Cadre. Among his various appointments, the important ones he has held are those of Deputy Commissioner of two districts - Bhiwani and Karnal, Chairman of the Haryana State Electricity Board, and Principal Secretary to the Chief Minister. He is currently a fellow of the Punjab University, Chandigarh and contributes articles in the Tribune. He will be followed by Colonel P K Vasudeva.

Colonel Vasudeva has had a distinguished career of over 25 years in the Army, wherein he participated in the 1965 and 1971 Wars, as well as in counter insurgency operations, for which he was awarded the Chief of the Army Staff commendation card. He did his PhD from the Punjab University. The subject of his research was "The World Trade Organisation". He did his Masters in Business Administration and Masters in English from the Punjab University. He is currently the President of the Chandigarh Management

Association and the Principal of the College of Communications Management. He has written four books, 123 research papers, 509 articles and 140 reviews.

Shri G V Gupta, the next speaker, is from the IAS of the 1961 batch. He taught economics before joining the administrative services. After retirement, he taught Property and Revenue laws in the Punjab University for five years. Presently, he is a freelance journalist, frequently contributing to the Tribune and Dainik Bhaskar.

Shri Baljit Rai is from the Indian Police Service. An alumni of the SD College and FC College of Lahore, he did his masters in History from the Ramjas College, Delhi University in 1951. He joined the IPS in 1954 and had a distinguished and exciting career in Punjab, Haryana and Delhi Police. He has also served in the BSF, the CRPF and the CISF - all Central Police Organisations. He has also served as Inspector General of Police, Tripura in the 1970s. Before retirement, he was the Resident Commissioner of Tripura in Delhi in the rank of Director General of Police. He has authored four books on Islamic fundamentalism.

SECOND SESSION : FIRST PAPER**SHRI RAM VARMA, IAS (RETD)**

India and the world in general are passing through tumultuous times. The 11 September 2001 attack on the US homeland galvanized the world to challenge terrorism on a greater scale. A war was launched against the Taliban in a conflict-ridden and misery-ravaged Afghanistan. Iraq is expected to be the next target. On South Asian soil, the Armies of India and Pakistan have been in deployed state for nearly six months. The world economy has faced a severe bout of recession for some years, only to be further compounded by the 9/11 strikes.

Challenges from Within: Governance Takes a Backseat

Though India's fragmented polity has had a semblance of stability under the present multi-party dispensation, governance has taken a backseat; dithering and weak-kneed responses to pressing problems have been characteristic of the Central Government. With a few notable exceptions, State Governments have been pursuing populist agendas, deferring hard decisions and marking time. Power and water sharing problems of the Punjab and Haryana are a case in point. The Centre's lackadaisical attitude has aggravated their problems.

The country seems to be under the effect of the kind of communal frenzy witnessed in the aftermath of Partition of India in 1947. Burning of a 'Hindu train' at Godhra, Hindu mobs butchering Muslims and setting fire to their settlements, with or without Government complicity, are reminiscent of the horrors of the Partition days. Are we heading for another Partition?

In the state of Jammu and Kashmir, it is beyond doubt that Pakistan is sponsoring terrorism and is blatantly refusing to desist. Does India have the will and wherewithal to punish Pakistan, the USA's interests in Pakistan notwithstanding? Could India resort to selective strikes as done by the Israelis to punish Palestine's terrorists? There is no point in costly standoffs.

The migration problem adds to the mess. Migrants such as those from Bangladesh pour in droves to be patronised by self-seeking politicians.

Despite availability of nearly 60 m tons of food, or more, 25 per cent of our population is living below the poverty line and 10 per cent at starvation level. Is there a way of utilising the food surpluses for creating community assets, like roads, water channels, ponds and so on? The country needs to build world level infrastructure in roads, power, tele-communications and so on. One cannot continue dabbling with the country's basic problems?

The foundations of the world's largest democracy are weak and shaky and need to be reinforced. The electoral reform bill brought out recently in compliance with the Supreme Court directives, will have a limited impact. Corruption and use of muscle power pervades the polity and administration. Black money runs a parallel economy. Most political parties have no internal democracy and are being run as personal fiefdoms on unaccounted money. A determined onslaught on poverty is required. Education levels, especially among females, are appalling despite 'mission modes'. Population control

should become a way of life. A time bound national programme for these three indicators should be worked out and implemented. It

should be acceptable to all major political parties, and all communities should be made to benefit from and accept it.

SECOND SESSION : SECOND PAPER**COLONEL P K VASUDEVA (RETD)****Introduction**

In 1997, thirty-two Kashmiri Pundits were massacred in Sangrampura (Budgam) and Wandhama (Ganderbal). In 1998, sixty-eight Hindus and thirty-five labourers in Jammu and Kashmir and Kalaban in Himachal Pradesh respectively were killed. In 1999, thirty-nine Hindus were killed in Rajouri, Anantnag, and Doda. In 2000, thirty-five Sikhs were killed in Chattisinghpura, five Hindus in Qazigund, thirty one people, mostly Amarnath Yatris, at Pahalgam, the attack by the suspected members of the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT) on a group of Hindu pilgrims going to Anantnag in Jammu and Kashmir on 6 August 2002, twenty seven labourers in Qazigund and Acchabal, seven family members in Kupwara, and eleven in Doda were gunned down. The storming of Badamibagh Corps Headquarters of the Army in Srinagar and killing of a Major and six Army personnel has cast grave concern among the security forces, especially the Army. The post-Kargil terrorist endeavours in Kupwara in early August had given ample notice to the Army of a new and daring attempt by the militants. The encounter in the Badamibagh cantonment further confirmed the resoluteness of the militant outfits like Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT), to attack security forces, and also eliminate politicians and other VIPs.

This attack coincided with the Lashkar-e-Toiba meeting held at Muridke in Pakistan with the permission of its then Chief Executive General Parvez Musharraf. More than 4,500 militants attended the meeting from Egypt, Sudan, Saudi Arabia, Afghanistan, and

Bahrain. An estimated 300,000 followers, who were not part of the meeting, knelt simultaneously in prayer as loudspeakers blared verses from the Koran, throughout the tent village at Muridke, roughly 25 km from Lahore. Banners extolling the values of jihad or holy wars throughout the world condemning the United States and India as enemies of Islam graced the gathering. The people gathered there were asked to contribute Rs.10 per head towards the war against India, saying the donation would cover the cost of one bullet meant to kill one Indian soldier.

The Lashkar-e-Toiba is fighting India for control of Jammu and Kashmir and its members were among those who captured Indian Territory in Kargil in the summer of 1999. Lashkar-e-Toiba, declared as a terrorist organisation by the US, openly seeks recruits to fight India in Jammu and Kashmir. The infiltrators' modus operandi of infiltrating their targets is by wearing the police or army uniform. This is an ongoing method in most of their successful terrorist attacks. This was the method used during the attack on the Indian Parliament on 13 December 2001. In the Kaluchak killings case, the terrorist could get into the well-guarded security unit family lines because they were in uniform.

It is unfortunate and troubling that not many questions have been raised either in the Parliament, the media, in public or in the various fora about the state of physical security infrastructure and the strategy that should be followed to tackle terrorism internally. Looking for crutches outside is not a worthy option. Instead of just blaming the

ISI of Pakistan or cross border terrorism propagated by Pakistan; India must search ways to counter terrorism with proper strategies? Can anyone dare carry out similar action in Pakistan, Tibet or Israel? The actual fact is that India is not geared to tackle terrorism and has not formulated proper strategy to tackle it. The main cause for failure of operations in Jammu and Kashmir is the lack of co-ordination between the Ministry of Defence (MoD) and Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) and the State Government. There is no clear-cut responsibility and authority on counter insurgency operations, (CIO). The accountability and blame for the failures is passed on to each other. Neither the Central Para Military Forces (CPMFs) are trained nor are they capable of handling the CIO against well-trained militants who are equipped with highly sophisticated weapons. All the decision-making authorities, especially the MHA must understand this fact.

Failures of Political Leadership

Indian political leadership has been committing serious mistakes right since 1948. It was a folly to have ordered cease-fire in Jammu and Kashmir when the Indian Defence forces were only 24 hours away from victory, in what is now Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (POK). The second mistake was the handing over of Haji Pir Pass to Pakistan, which was captured during the 1965 operations. The third mistake was the handing over of the 93,000 prisoners of war (POWs) to Pakistan (captured in East Pakistan, now Bangladesh, during the 1971 operations) after the signing of Shimla Agreement by the leaders of India and Pakistan. It was an excellent opportunity for India to do some hard bargaining with Pakistan to settle the Jammu and Kashmir

issue on a permanent basis before handing over the POWs once for all. The fourth mistake is not allowing Indian troops to cross the Line of Control (LOC) to gain strategic heights elsewhere in Jammu and Kashmir during the Kargil operations. This resulted in the unnecessary and unprecedented sacrifice of our men in uniform. The fifth mistake is the negotiation with Hizbul Mujahadeen knowing fully well that the remote control rests with Pakistan's General Parvez Musharraf. The sixth mistake has been lack of proper Indian strategy to carry out counter insurgency operations and non-functioning of the so-called Unified Command in Jammu and Kashmir.

Army's Success Story

The Punjab. The militancy in Punjab had affected the life and peace of the people there for almost a decade in the 1980s. The situation in Punjab is now normal. A large number of hardcore militants have been eliminated. It will be wrong to ascribe the turn about in the law and order situation to any single factor or individual. It is attributable to a combination of factors and the coming together of a large number of like-minded people, the will of the affected people, and above all, the Army that played an important role in bringing normalcy, peace, tranquility, and democracy in the State. The situation prior to induction of the Army was that of despair and hopelessness among the people there, especially in the villages. The terror unleashed by the militants, the uncertainty of life, the inability of the police and other Paramilitary forces in providing security to the masses had created a sense of fear and uncertainty. The civil administration had completely paralysed, and the police force completely demoralised and rendered ineffective. Terrorist groups moved freely,

carrying weapons in the villages. Extortion and firing were the order of the day. The media published only the subversive letters under threats from the militants. The schools and colleges, and the public health centres stopped functioning regularly. Covert political patronage to terrorists further inhibited the functioning of Paramilitary forces and civil police. No civil servant or a politician dared to visit their areas of responsibility, because of threats from the militants. No new projects came up because the contractors and the labour left the state for alternative business elsewhere.

The state of affairs having deteriorated, complimented by grave external threat posed by Pakistan in early 1990, the Government was left with no other option but to call the Army to assist the civil administration to bring back normalcy in the State.

The North East. In the North East, the Army has been able to restore normalcy by carrying out counter-insurgency operations without the help of the police and the paramilitary forces. Wherever police and other security forces have been used, they have been put under command of the Army. This is how the counter insurgency operations have been successful in the North East.

Where Have We Failed

Unified Command: The unified command concept as instituted and implemented in Jammu and Kashmir, to tackle insurgency, functioned inadequately during the Central rule and has been further diluted under popular rule. Presently it is functioning under the chairmanship of the Chief Minister. It includes other members from the Army such as the Corps Commander, who is the military advisor,

Director General of Police and Directors of the Paramilitary forces. In the absence of the Chief Minister the civil authorities insist that the Chief Secretary, who is not an expert on insurgency, should chair it. The Army is not happy with this setup, because there is hardly any coordination between the Ministry of Defence, Ministry of Home Affairs and the State of Jammu and Kashmir to give clear-cut directions for carrying out counter-insurgency operations. When terrorism is supported by the outside agencies like the ISI of Pakistan with trained and hard-core armed foreign militants from across the border, the police and the Paramilitary forces just cannot tackle them independently.

Lack of sensors and night firing capabilities: Even after fighting the Kargil battle without sensors and the night firing equipment the soldiers still have not been equipped with the latest equipment for operations by night.

Mobilisation of Troops: India has mobilised its forces, deployed them at the battle positions, and laid land mines at a number of expected ingress routes. This is the first time since 1971 operations that the landmines have been laid at selected places by the Army.

However, three landmine related accidents on the international border at Ganganagar and Longewala in Rajasthan, and Atari in Punjab, which have killed at least 36 soldiers since 25 December 2001 should be a matter of grave concern to the Army. A number of farmers of the border villages have also strayed into the minefields. How many more will fall victim to mine accidents and death during lifting of mines or due to straying in the minefield without fighting a battle is anybody's guess.

War Machinery

India is now in catch 22 position as neither it can de-mobilise its forces nor it can launch an attack on the terrorist camps across the border. Because more than one lakh American troops are carrying out manoeuvres in Pakistan to catch Osama bin Laden. The US is occupying major air bases in Pakistan.

The troops are mobilised only when a country is either to launch an offensive or take a defensive posture fearing an attack from across the borders. In the present case, both are missing. India is neither attacking the terrorist camps nor Pakistan is in a position to launch any offensive against India. Hence, the strategy of Indian Government has failed completely. If the present stalemate continues, the morale of the troops is going to be affected in a big way because the politicians and the bureaucrats who are responsible for the mobilisation are enjoying as usual.

Pakistan's Strategy

General Pervez Musharraf has definite, long term strategic plans to annex Jammu and Kashmir. Some of his strategic plans for the Jammu and Kashmir are as under: -

- (a) He has committed openly that Pakistan will give political and moral support to freedom fighters of Jammu and Kashmir.
- (b) He has deployed ex-servicemen all along the Line of Control (LoC) in Jammu and Kashmir, to make them a force to reckon with, and woo the Kashmiri villagers across the Line of Control.

(c) He has created a Nuclear Command and the requisite infrastructure for command and control of nuclear forces.

(d) Pakistan is indulging in lip service and cosmetic action regarding arrest of terrorist outfits only to be released later.

(e) The infiltration into Jammu and Kashmir has not stopped. It will increase further after the snow starts melting away in the next few months.

(f) Musharraf discusses strategic issues at the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee and National Security Council meetings.

(g) Musharraf is following the Chanakya Niti of "Be friendly to enemy's enemy".

That is why he has the best of relations with China and he always keeps Chinese leadership informed about Indian threats and measures that can be taken by China to help Pakistan during crisis.

Indian Strategic Planning to Counter Terrorism

The estimates committee of the Parliament in its 20th report on the Ministry of Defence (MoD) regarding policy making and system of higher direction has deprecated the lack of strategic planning and thinking at the national level. It pointed out that the directions and tasks must necessarily flow from well-defined policies or else the armed forces guided by ad hocism will flounder.

The US also commissioned a study on

'Indian Strategic Thought' in view of the improved Indo-US relations. George Tanham of RAND Corporation, the prestigious think tank of US, concluded in this study that India has no strategic culture or tradition. He maintains that India is an inward-looking country and its history, geography, culture and civilisation have shaped this tradition. The main cause of the failure of the operations in Jammu and Kashmir is the lack of coordination between the MoD, MHA and the State. There is no clear-cut responsibility and accountability for counter insurgency operations (CIO) between Army and CPMFs.

If this controversy between the MoD, the MHA and the State persists, any hopes of solving militancy in Jammu and Kashmir will dissolve. The Army must be given an independent task of CI Ops in the Valley and the Rashtriya Rifles need to be expanded further. CPMFs should be put under command of the Army to carry out the internal security duties for which they are trained.

The example of Israel and the USA in tackling terrorism must be followed. In the event of a terrorist taking a shot at even a single civilian or a soldier, the response of the Israeli Armed Forces is to destroy that area. Interestingly, there is no retaliation from the other side. In India, it is the other way round, because the life of a soldier here is taken for granted. The presumption is that they are supposed to die for the country. This is one of the reasons why the elite of the society do not come forward to join the Armed Forces. It was a matter of prestige for the royal families in the yesteryears to serve in the Armed Forces.

In India, when the Cabinet Committee on Security meets, the Services Chiefs are invited as observers but they have no say.

Despite the recommendations of the Kargil Committee, Defence Task Force and the Group of Ministers' recommendations for the appointment of Chief of Defence Staff, the political leadership in the country has not yet taken the decision. Unless the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) is appointed and involved in the strategic decision-making, India cannot win a decisive battle against terrorism. The National Security Council (NSC) should work out a 'low level threat strategy' in Jammu and Kashmir to counter Low Intensity Conflict Operations (LICO); once and for all especially when Osama bin Laden has called for a jihad against India and the USA.

A strong political will to tackle terrorism is possible if complete responsibility is given to the Army. And, this can be done if the strength of the Army is increased to 2 million as China did after its independence, with the People Liberation Army (PLA) of 4 million though it has been reduced to 2.76 million now, after having accomplished the task of annexing Tibet, taking complete control of Aksai Chin, restoring supremacy in Hong Kong and after settling the border dispute with Russia and also to some extent with India. Rest of the Organisation's structure and the weapon system can be worked out separately. The police and the Paramilitary forces should be entrusted with only the law and order machinery, for which they have been raised, trained and tasked, and should be made accountable.

Conclusion

The only option available to India is to carry out limited strikes on the known 77 Pakistani militant training camps, which are active and functional. There is no doubt that Pakistan would react violently and retaliate

by crossing the Line of Control (LoC) in the areas where the terrain is favourable to its forces.

India in that case will have to use its Air Force and Pakistan would certainly retaliate. India would be able to get better of the conflict because of superior manpower as well as weapons and equipment.

Pakistan would not be in a position to face India's conventional might. Hence it will first send thousands of jihadis waiting to cross the LoC and give full artillery and armoured support to them. India will then have no other option but to attack across the international border and then negotiate for the exchange of territories as usual. Pakistan has declared that it will use the nuclear first strike option when it feels that it is losing a battle and is in danger of being defeated. Pakistan has already created a Nuclear Command two years back. India is yet to take a decision on this aspect. Is India

ready to face such an attack? Will the Indian command structure, especially its nuclear command (yet to be created and made functional under the CDS) and control system have the capacity to continue to function after such an attack?

Theoretically, the decision to use nuclear weapons will rest with the top political leadership - the National Command Authority - headed by the Prime Minister and it will convey its views direct or through the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS). The delivery system or 'vectors' - warplanes or missiles will remain with the services. The Indian Navy is planning to deploy cruise missiles capable of being launched under water with the help of Russian bombers.

Indian strategy for tackling terrorism is a failure so far. India has to change its strategy to tackle terrorism, which it is facing since 1989 in Jammu and Kashmir. Terrorism cannot be uprooted by rhetoric alone.

SECOND SESSION : THIRD PAPER**SHRI G V GUPTA, IAS (RETD)**

Globalisation of trade, manufacturing, investment, property rights, values of human rights and democracy and culture has significantly diluted the concept of sovereignty and nation state. While nuclear states find it increasingly difficult to resort to arms against each other, weaker, non-nuclear states are having very little say in world politics. A new universal order is being created. New international institutions are being created with adjudicative powers backed by automatic sanctions against nation states defaulting on international norms and agreements. The assertion of ethnic identity and increasing importance of participatory democracy at the local level is circumscribing the power of state internally. External relations are no longer the exclusive preserve of national governments and in a federal set up like India, constituent states are playing an increasingly important role, particularly with regards to nations bordering such states. People living near borders want to be adequately compensated for loss due to disturbances caused by defensive manoeuvres. This necessitates radical rethinking on security issues, its strategies and its instruments.

Economic and political stability of Pakistan, Nepal, Sri Lanka, Burma and Afghanistan are matters of international concern and so is the dispute over Jammu and Kashmir. All this is important, particularly in relation to international terrorism. NMD, Mid-east oil, the terrorists in the Pashtun hills, civilisational conflicts, intra and inter-Islamic conflicts, security of Indian Ocean and peace on borders, and in Jammu and Kashmir, are important Indian concerns. Most of them have

internal as also external implications. Emergence of European Union and economically powerful Japan are other important external factors constraining national options. An important voice is that of the Indian diaspora abroad.

Artificial borders as colonial legacy and nationalist assertion creating boundaries out of fuzzy frontiers has turned mixed populations into minorities. Their assertion of identity is suspect, while neighbouring nations deem it their moral duty to look after the welfare of others' minorities. South and South-East Asia are theatres of uneven social and economic development and internal tensions. India's West is largely feudal and monolithic. South is high on human development indices but ridden with violent, ethnic conflicts. Burma is totally inward looking. China is in the throes of being a global economic operator but under strict conditions of party-rule and, therefore, high on corruption index. This region is thus a cocktail with a hazy future.

Newer developments in electronic communications and controls have added to the redundancy of internal security systems based on half a century old colonial system of control of law and order. Old strategy or segregation of habitats and control over communications, movements and supplies has a very limited application now. Electronic communication systems easily bypass such controls and the need for physical movement. Easy availability of chemicals has put instruments of destruction within easy reach. A conflict puts heavy economic costs in

various ways. Security set up has thus to work within increasing limitations. It is necessary thus to forge new economic, political, diplomatic and strategic tools. New options have to be created. Our security and defence forces need massive rethinking, reorganisation and retooling. An adequate response has to be a composite response: political, economic, diplomatic, armed and propagandist, and, both, internal and external. It will be difficult to compartmentalise it.

Geo-politically speaking, Chinese priority is economic except for NMD. It is also worried about Islamic terrorism. It is, therefore, likely to be interested in settlement of its border dispute with India. It is against any American presence in Jammu and Kashmir and, therefore, against the latter's independence. Russia is looking West but has strong economic and security interests in common with India. It is also interested in the Caspian Sea and Middle-East oil and its outlet is via Afghanistan-Pakistan and Iran. Therefore, it wants stability and friendship in this region. Its friendship with India will be increasingly without cost to Pakistan. America is vastly interested in the Indian market and its manufactures. Its fear of China provides India with manoeuvrability. Stable relations with China will open new options for India. Pakistan has critical importance for America, till an alternative is available in Iran or Iraq. Iran has interests antagonistic to Pakistan. Iraq is an important source of oil for India. This is an important security issue. Improved American relationship with Iraq will be of advantage to India. Central Asia is of importance to us. It is obvious that internally we must maintain communal harmony. Indifferent relations with Pakistan, China and Bangladesh mean that we can neither reach the natural resources of Central Asia nor the huge markets of South-East Asia, through

the land route. The exit can only be through the sea route, for which we require secure navigation of the Indian Ocean and passage to the Gulf in the West and Singapore and beyond to the East. This has obvious implications for Navy and merchant shipping.

As of now, India's security environment is problematic in relation to its immediate borders. There is Pakistan's *Azadi* Movement in Jammu and Kashmir; Maoists in Nepal; ULFA in Bhutan; migration and minority problems with Bangladesh; issues of border migrations with Myanmar; border dispute with China, LTTE problem with Sri Lanka, the ethnic movements in North-East; and the Chakma problem of Tripura border. Except for the Maoists issue, all other problems were actualised in achieving 'Nationhood'. Solutions to these have to be found largely in internal responses. The Naxal and Peoples War Group movements are purely political in nature. They have adopted guerrilla tactics. There is no evidence of any substantial current external assistance to movements in the North East. Recognition of ethnic autonomy, easier cross border movements, larger political and economic space to local leadership, increasing chances in the larger national sphere and emergence of new national leaders, with judicious use of force have largely solved these issues. The Naga problem is more of a local problem now.

The Nepalese Maoist movement, led by Delhi-educated leadership can be potentially a more serious security problem. It has strong ideological and ethnic content, with strong local backing. It can find sympathetic response in India's border areas though as yet there is no strong evidence of it. China seems to put out a sense of indifference to it. But it does require a friendly government in Nepal backed by economic,

political, military and administrative assistance. India, on its part requires to make radical changes in its trade policies vis a vis Nepal.

Unstable response to the LTTE is an abject lesson in the futility of support to a terrorist organisation to achieve political aims. The political fall out of assassination of Rajiv Gandhi has been significant. We also face prospects of a Tamil divide. Our leadership in mediatory efforts has been lost and a large area of distrust has been created. LTTE grew with Indian support but has become autonomous in Indian polity. It requires carefully crafted multiple responses. International pressure has to be brought against use of arms and provision of funds. Political space for Tamil aspirations within an integrated Sri Lanka has to be located and strong political and economic backing to that nation has to be provided. A careful political path with a common strategy has to be tread in Tamil Nadu by those who have to form a government there. Lack of control over LTTE has the possibility of becoming a serious security problem in future. A study of LTTE is replete with lessons on limitations of statecraft in dealing with Jammu and Kashmir, and Pakistan.

The Jammu and Kashmir problem acquired strong communal colour in 1980. Strong Central intervention in the eighties convinced Farooq Abdullah that his survival depended on his relations with the Central government. The Centre in turn depended solely on him. That left no space for others. This created a sense of alienation and gave strength to the Azadi movement. Youths took to violence with manpower and material support from Pakistan. The terror tactics saw the 'Pandit' population migrate from their homeland. Loyalty of the local police and

administration became doubtful; it became largely an armed forces affair in an unreliable territory, and Central grants became a victim of loot in the Valley alienating the Kashmiris further. After fifteen years' conflict, however, people realise that foreign assistance is extremely costly as is resort to arms. They realise that external Mujahids have become autonomous and have developed their own agenda. They further realise that it is not possible to take on the might of an organised modern state like India. Neither Hurriyat nor Pakistan offer any worthwhile alternative political programme, which could give direction to the Azadi movement. The verdict is clear - the age of redefining borders is gone. Therefore, while one section wants Azadi, probably, with international guarantees, the other wants autonomy for the Valley. The region of Ladakh is not a problem. But in Jammu there is some campaign for merger of a few Muslim majority areas with Pakistan.

Terrorism in Kashmir is now largely mercenary and is fanatical only to some extent. It has no political ideology except for a universal Islam for some. It has no ideology for Kashmiris. The real danger lies in the fact that there are many in India, Pakistan and in Jammu and Kashmir who have developed interests in the continuation of the conflict.

Free elections are important to provide an honourable, alternative political space to the people. Any division of Jammu and Kashmir is not acceptable. A meaningful guarantee of talk on autonomy should be given. This should create a larger constituency interested in India. The government in power and the opposition must evolve a common view, privately at least. Considerable autonomy should be ensured

to Jammu and Ladakh regions, with law and order powers for adequate security response as also to remove the feeling of oppression in the Valley. Major part of Central grants should go to local bodies directly and spent under participatory management. Local elections are more important, in the sense that it will create a large local leadership with interest in India.

It is imperative that our security forces are adequately equipped, to effectively carry out their options. We require more effective probing as also defensive operations. We obviously need force multipliers more than manpower.

An unfortunate aspect is that there is lack of civil society intervention in Jammu and Kashmir. There is interaction within India and with Pakistan also, but few go to Jammu and Kashmir and still fewer are invited from the valley to interact with the rest in India. The valley leadership remains ignorant of fresher democratic impulses in India and Indians in cities and towns are prone to misunderstand the genuine feelings there. There is strong federalist upsurge in India which, in due course, will guarantee substantial autonomy to the state.

The policy of economic autarky followed after independence raised large barriers to external trade, giving rise to smugglers and their supporters in police, politics and bureaucracy. Theoretical inviolability of borders caused misery to mixed populations there and disrupted traditional trade and exchange. Special commodity deals with neighbours only create rent seekers in those countries who import from third countries at low duty rates and with small value addition export them duty free to India. They pocket the duty differences in collaboration with Indian business and political interests. It

creates no industry there but unearned income creates jealousy and hatred towards India. Remedy is a customs union. If others don't join, India should unilaterally lower its duty structure. During last decade, from total ban on imports of consumers and average duty structure of 80 per cent. India has come down to about 30 per cent average levy with large liberalisation of consumer imports. This has only strengthened India's external sector with \$60 bn. reserves and continuously expanding exports. India, for the first time had a trade surplus in 2000-01. We must press forward. This will remove largest interest vested in the continuation of conflict. Last decades' economic reforms have raised per capita income growth rate four times from 1 per cent to 4 per cent and India has overtaken Pakistan. Another decade of reforms will finish Pakistan's game. India's size and growth will be deterrent enough.

We immediately need reforms to change our policing, from colonial system based on distrust of the native, to a democratic one. We need an educated and efficient constable, capable of taking decision as per law and acting on his own accordingly. Maintenance of order and jurisdiction on large number of local crimes should go to local bodies assisted by municipal police, freeing state and central structure to deal with international, interstate and sophisticated crimes. This will help in communal harmony.

But the problem of a feudal Pakistan ruled by a dictator will still be there. Some in Pakistan still believe in the destiny of Pakistan as the leader of modern Muslim world. State sponsored terrorism, therefore, is simply imperialism by 'other' means, with universal Islam as its core value. A democratic Pakistan, respectful of its local cultures and well on the path of modernisation, can only

be a peaceful neighbour. It's dependence on terrorism as a state policy has brought it to a potential civil war as terrorists and fundamentalists become autonomous force within the state. Therefore, there is a possibility of a mad adventure, though low one, till professionals in the army remain in control. There is a chance that slowly the feudal elements will replace the professionals in the army there. India has to be patient, ready with a deterrent, and help all international moves to stabilise, modernise and democratise Pakistan. A decade of reforms and growth will help India do it.

Weaning away of Pakistan from the path of terrorism as state policy, by the international community, will significantly

reduce the strength of international Islamic terrorism, though it will not die soon. Islam has a history and social philosophy in conflict with the Christian West. For many Muslims, it is the Islamic value of equality versus the Western value of liberty. For the oppressed, terrorism will remain a valid tool for years to come. A reformed capitalism, totally free of the bondage of nationalism, and believing in universal equality of opportunity and liberty and with supply of public goods or basic freedoms is still some decades away.

In the meanwhile, it is important for India to be aggressive on the issue of democracy, human rights, and strong judicial system as the sole repository of these values in the East.

SECOND SESSION : FOURTH PAPER**BALJIT RAI, IPS (RETD)**

India is undergoing tectonic changes. The two serious challenges confronting India are demographic explosion and the spread of fundamentalism. There is a serious clash between Hindu and Islamic fundamentalism, both questioning the validity of Indian secularism. The response of the managers of Indian security to these challenges has been less than tepid - almost non-existent.

General Observations -Security Lapses at the National Level

Any study related to the problem of India's internal security calls for introspection at the national level. A casual glance at the problems that we are facing since the last 50 years or so would reveal the numerous chinks in the armour of India's security, to the advantage of the Jihadis and other terrorists. Here, the emphasis lies more on Jihad and Jihadis than on Muslims. While all Jihadis are Muslims, not all Muslims are Jihadis.

How deep our commitment to the concept of national security is will be evident from the following lapses, acts of commission and omission and losses suffered by the nation.

(a) On 13 December 2001 the nation witnessed an attack on its Parliament by five well-armed Pakistani Jihadis. The humiliation inflicted on the nation would have been benumbing, had they succeeded in entering the building and blowing it up, and massacring the Members of Parliament. The sheer

audacity of the Jihadis was stunning in its conception, planning and execution. These Jihadis were no ordinary terrorists and were inspired by blinding Islamic fervour. Earlier, the Red Fort in Delhi was attacked by Jihadis; no lessons were learnt from that incident. The attack on the Parliament came just two months after the 9/11 attacks in USA.

(b) In the 1947-48 Indo-Pak War, India handed over 80,000 sq. km. area of Jammu and Kashmir on a platter to Pakistan.

(c) China managed to grab 35,000 sq. km. (Aksai Chin) of the state of Jammu and Kashmir, entirely due to our negligence.

(d) China's invasion of India in 1962 was again the result of our complacency and neglect of our frontiers.

(e) Pakistan's proxy war has claimed more than 30,000 lives during the last 20 years and the Indian security system is utterly helpless in eradicating this menace.

(f) While Pakistan is prosecuting her proxy war relentlessly against India, Bangladesh on the eastern frontier has unleashed an equally devastating, if not more, demographic aggression against India. The proxy war by Pakistan and demographic aggression by Bangladesh are lethal amalgam that is incinerating

India. While the declared aim of Pakistan is to grab remaining part of Jammu and Kashmir, the target of Bangladesh is to alter the demography of all the seven states in the North East and merge them with Bangladesh, to accommodate her burgeoning population. It is utter lack of security consciousness among the Indian establishment which has emboldened these two Islamic states to become such a menace and unabashedly lay claim to our areas. Bangladeshis are openly talking of this need for their exploding population.

(g) The Indian Army had a number of its ammunition depots blown up resulting in loss of hundred of crores of rupees and vital ammunition.

(h) How is it that hundred of Madrassas, the nurseries of Islamic terrorists, have been allowed to mushroom in various parts of India, especially in the areas bordering Pakistan, Bangladesh and Nepal?

(j) The notorious case of the Purulia arms drop is well known. Which security barrier did these daredevils not break through?

(k) A Don in Karachi can hold the entire Indian film industry to ransom and dictate terms to one and all. The Indian security system is not only helpless but paralysed. Numerous illegal investments are being made and yet the Indian state has not been able to do anything about it.

Demographic Profile of India and its Effect on Economy

One of the important factors that

impinge on India's internal security is her explosive demography, as revealed by the following figures: -

Total Population of India (in millions)

1981	1991	2001
660	816	1027
Net increase	1981-1991	= 156
	1991-2001	= 211

It may be noted that during 1981-2001, India added 367 million heads to its existing population and crossed the one billion (1027 million) mark in the year 2001. A study of the demographic map of India is absolutely imperative to comprehend the gravity of the economic and security situation in India. Irrespective of the fertility rate and considering the rate of growth during the last 20 years, India will be adding at least 400 million, if not more, to its population as it stood in 2001. Thus, by 2020, India's population will be a whopping 1467 (plus/minus) millions. Is the Indian economy capable of providing wherewithal to all its people to sustain life? While the growth of population in India will be of staggering proportion, add to it the population of Bangladesh and Pakistan, which would rise to about 600 million by 2020 from 362.2 million in 1999. The total population of these three areas would total 2000 million by 2020. Millions of Bangladesh nationals would infiltrate into India, seriously upsetting India's economic system in the process. The economic planners in India, Pakistan or Bangladesh are least bothered about this challenge. There is not even the slightest indication of this in the print media. Food, clothing, housing, education, medical facilities and communication etc. would be required on a gigantic scale.

There are quite a few visionaries in India who think that India can be hammered into a powerful nation by the year 2020. This looks to be more of a wishful thinking. P V Indiresan, a futurologist, has given the following scenario by the year 2050 in the India Today magazine of October 2000

- (a) India's population will be 1.5 billion and growing.
- (b) Eighty per cent of the population will live in congested, polluted cities.
- (c) Eighty per cent of the city's population will live in slums.
- (d) The state will have little control: villages will be dominated by Naxalites and cities by slumlords.
- (e) Daily commuting will take over four hours.
- (f) Delhi and Mumbai will each have a population of 80 million or more.
- (g) Even for bathing, only bottled water may be safe.
- (h) There will be an average of a hundred murders a day in Delhi and Mumbai.
- (j) Security checks will be mandatory before one boards a bus.
- (k) People will move from fortress-like apartment buildings to electronically-monitored offices in armoured vehicles.
- (l) The Indian capital will be salted abroad.

(k) Houses will be tiny and marriages will go out of fashion. Quite a frightening picture!

Now, can India, which has been ranked 124th in a list of 166 countries in the year 2001, in terms of Human Development Index, provide even a modicum of the barest necessities of life, the most primary need being that of potable water, both in urban and rural areas. If 50 years of planned economy have earned India the 124th slot, in terms of human development, it is more than likely, rather a matter of certitude, that India will descend to even a lower position in an economy which is globalised and anchored in laissez-faire. With millions and millions of people living below the poverty line and rising awareness of their plight being roused by the media, specially electronic media, the only outlet available to them to seek redress of their problems and redemption would be violence, which would seriously undermine internal security of the nation. Those entrusted with the task of planning or improving machinery for internal security would miss every target if they fail to take note of explosive demographic trends into consideration. Socio-economic unrest, with a strong amalgam of religious fanaticism, casteism, illiteracy, utter lawlessness in many states of India, has spawned phenomena like the Naxalites, People's War Group, Maoists, Marxists and Leninists of various hues and they will continue to multiply. It must be remembered that few states in India have been able to contain violence unleashed by these incendiary elements. The situation is so desperate and uncontrollable that state governments want to enter into dialogue with these groups in order to end violence, but prospects in this regard, to say the least, are bleak.

World Population Growth and its Impact on Economic Situation in India

Population in Millions

Country	1999	Area (in sq. km.)
China	1264.8	9561000
India	992.7	3280483
USA	280.4	9399317
Indonesia	209.3	1904869
Brazil	168.2	8511965
Russian Federation	146.2	17075000
Pakistan	137.6	801483
Bangladesh	134.6	144000
Japan	126.8	377535
Nigeria	110.8	923765

Source : United Nations

It is observed that :-

(a) China and India are the only two countries in the world which have broken the demographic barrier of one billion.

(b) The population of India, Pakistan and Bangladesh (which are part of one well defined geographical area) combined together (1274.9 million) was more than the population of China (1264.8 million) in 1999.

(c) Area-wise, China is three times the size of India and more than twice the size of India, Pakistan and Bangladesh put together.

(d) The next most populous country in the world is the USA (280 million)

but way behind India in population. Area - wise, India is 1/3rd the size of United States.

(e) Of all the ten countries mentioned above, Bangladesh is the smallest in area and also the poorest.

(f) Out of the remaining 156 countries (not listed) in the world, only 13 have population above 50 million but below 100 million. The remaining 143 country's population is below 50 million each.

These figures have been given to highlight the fact that lack of opportunities that will continue to afflict the Indian citizen and his multiple deprivations would give rise to massive destabilisation of society and seriously jeopardize internal security. Considering the level of violence generated

by socio-economic and religious factors, it is not difficult to visualise the shape of things to come.

Growth of Muslim Population in India : Its Impact on the Security of India

While the size of India's population is socially and economically extremely oppressive and destructive of quality of life and natural environment, another aspect, which is transforming India faster than any other factor, is its religious composition. This factor is leading to Islamisation of India at a galloping pace. The two largest groups of people in India, Pakistan and Bangladesh are the Hindus and the Muslims and the following table gives the relative strengths of each.

Hindu/Muslim Population (in millions) in the Indian Subcontinent - 2001

	Hindu	Muslim
India	825	166 (including 40 million Bangladeshi Muslims)
Pakistan	Nil	140
Bangladesh	10	130
Total	835	436

As can be observed, in the entire Indian sub-continent there are 436 million Muslims (more than 1/3rd of the entire Muslim population in the world) as against 835 million Hindus. Hindu to Muslim ratio is just 1.9:1 i.e. there is 1 Muslim for every 1.9 Hindus. The total rate of fertility in Pakistan, Bangladesh and India being 5.5, 3.8 and 3.3 respectively, it is only a matter of time for

the Muslim population to catch up with the Hindus. During the last five decades, growth of the Muslim population in each decade in India had always been higher by ten percentage points over the growth of the Hindu population. Once the two communities match, more or less equally, there will be a sea change in the political equations which could seriously undermine the security of India. It should be remembered that the only factor which brought about the partition of India was the numerical strength of the two communities. This game of numbers will continue indefinitely and once the Muslims have achieved parity or near parity with the Hindus, the consequences not only for India but the entire world could be awesome.

Demographic Threat from Bangladesh

The potential of Bangladesh to radically redraw the demographic map of India, particularly her eastern and north-eastern states, is well-known and evident. Before giving the ramifications of this threat, a look at the profile of this theocratic state and nation would help us to gain the true measure of the problem facing India. Bangladesh covers an area of 1,44,000 sq. km. In 2001, its population had touched 140 million of whom 90 per cent were Muslims. In area, Bangladesh is 1/25th the size of India but contains population which is 1/7th of India's. The rate of growth of population is so high that by the year 2017, her population would rise to 240 millions. These projected figures are given by the government of Bangladesh. The density of population per sq km is 972. The density of population in Bangladesh is three times that of India which is 324. Bangladesh is the poorest country in the world. It gets its petrol and petroleum products free of cost from oil rich Middle East countries. It has to pay only transport

charges. Its literacy rate is 25.8 per cent for males and 13.2 for females.

To relieve pressure on their own land, Bangladeshis, by design, illegally migrate to India and spread themselves along the length and breadth of the country, as they have been doing in the past, and radically alter the demographic profile of the Indian states. The Indian media has to be congratulated for repeatedly drawing attention to the festering problem of infiltration from Bangladesh, but it has not produced the slightest effect on the security apparatus of the nation. Their response has been disappointing, if not non-existent.

Culpability of Political Parties in Promoting Infiltration from Bangladesh

It has become customary for us to blame Pakistan, Bangladesh and Islamic fundamentalist forces for abetting sinister designs against India, to change her demography through massive infiltration. However, we ignore the questionable role of Indian political parties. Why are our political parties promoting and encouraging infiltration from Bangladesh? Given below are instances that highlight this aspect.

(a) The fact is that enlistment of foreigners in the voters' list has, at times, taken place at the instance of politically interested persons or parties (read Congress). Political parties have been known to take dubious steps to inflate the number of their supporters at the election time, and some undoubtedly used the illegal settlers from Pakistan towards this end. "Many Pakistani nationals who left Tripura themselves stated, on return, that they had helped, worked and voted for the

candidates of a particular political party in India".

(Source: Documents of the Ministry of External Affairs published In 1963).

(b) "It is observed that more and more Muslim immigrants are settling down in the border areas. Accordingly, large stretches of the border in these States are becoming predominantly inhabited by Bangladeshi Muslims. The simmering communal tension in some of the border areas is one of the manifestations of the effects of large scale illegal migration of Bangladeshi nationals who have slowly displaced or dispossessed the local population, particularly those belonging to the Hindu community, in these areas."

(c) "The Hindu immigrants have been generally staying in shanties in miserable conditions in visible concentration in South West Bengal district. The Muslim infiltrators have mostly fanned out to urban areas in other States most notably in Delhi, Rajasthan, Gujarat, Maharashtra etc. In the metropolitan cities of Delhi and Bombay not less than 4-5 lakh Bangladeshi Muslims have been residing".

(d) "Employment potential in these areas (Calcutta Metropolitan Complex) has become extremely low due to high level of overpopulation. As a result, an ever-increasing number of infiltrators, therefore, after crossing the border move to distant places, i.e. interior districts of West Bengal, Bihar, New Delhi, Bombay, Ahmedabad, Jaipur etc."

(e) "Demographic changes have produced sharply adverse Hindu-Muslim ratio in the population in several border districts in the States adjoining Bangladesh. The influx of illegal migrants who have settled in the border districts in West Bengal, North-Eastern States and Bihar had transformed these districts into overwhelmingly immigrant population districts. The change in the religious composition of population has created socio-economic and religious problems. In as many as 56 Constituencies they have a major electoral voice".

(Source 2-5: Internal note prepared by the Home Ministry Government of India, in March, 1992).

(f) "It is time to ponder, if Bangladeshis are infiltrating into Calcutta, Bombay, Delhi, Ahmedabad, etc. should we think that there is no infiltration into Tripura, which has a 786 km border without any natural barriers, and into Assam, which has about 300 km border with Bangladesh".

"It would be interesting to note that a group of intellectuals in Dacca is seeking to legitimise the immigration of Muslims into the adjoining areas of North East region by invoking the theory of lebensraum or living space. A number of Dacca dailies carried articles written on these lines by university professors. They were not at all apologetic about the infiltration. People are sought to be inspired by the hope that one day the north-eastern region will be added to Bangladesh, giving it a natural boundary, in place of present one which throttles Bangladesh".

(g) The infiltrations are not only by minorities of Bangladesh but also from the majority community, Muslims. In absolute terms, the number of Muslims crossing into India is likely to be much larger than that of non-Muslims. "An ideological support is given to the phenomenon by the Islamic fundamentalists, creating the vision of a larger Islamic country comprising Bangladesh and the entire north-east, where its economic problems will be solved and security ensured".

(Source: Report of the General Secretaries -1st March, 1989 to 2nd July 1992 -to the Seventh General Conference North Eastern Congress (I) Coordination Committee, Guwahati, 3rd July, 1992. This Report was submitted to Sh. PA Sangma, Former Speaker of Lok Sabha).

More than Pakistan and Bangladesh, it is the Indian political parties which have a lot to explain about their nefarious role in the infiltration of Bangladeshi nationals into India.

The IMDT Act, 1983

The political parties have not only been encouraging infiltrators and giving them facilities like ration cards and inclusion of their names in electoral rolls but have also provided them legal protection against detection and deportation from India by passing the IMDT Act 1983. It would be no exaggeration to say that never has the Indian Parliament passed a more pernicious piece of legislation than this Act, which was placed on the statute book for the protection of Muslim infiltrators from Bangladesh. It has been rightly questioned as to why should there be two laws for the same kind of

offenders. While the Foreigner's Act is applicable to citizens all over the country, Assam alone has the distinction of having a separate Act (IMDT Act) to deal with the infiltrators from Bangladesh. The procedure laid down in the Act is so cumbersome, complicated and difficult that it is almost impossible to enforce it or make proper use of it. In fact the complainant in such cases is in danger of losing his life at the hands of the infiltrators who would not like to be detected and deported from India. Very serious efforts have been made to have this Act repealed but there is equally strong resistance from certain political parties who do not want their vote banks to be undermined.

History of Jihadi Terrorism in India During the 20th Century

The twentieth century in India has been the bloodiest in the history of the country. Jihadi terrorism in India has a very long history and its outstanding trophies are the Mopla rebellion (1921), Kohat massacre (1924), the Great Calcutta killings, Noakhali and Tippera (1946), ethnic cleansing of minorities in Pakistan (1947), continuous genocide of minorities in East Pakistan/Bangladesh, proxy war by Pakistan which has claimed more than 30,000 lives and ending with a major strike on the Indian Parliament, which is the symbol of Indian sovereignty. There has never been a pause in Jihadi terrorism, nor will there be as long as we do not take due cognisance of Jihadi mindset, which is reflected in the writings of F.K. Khan Durrani "The Meaning of Pakistan" quoted at page 244 of the book *The Tragic Story of Partition of India* by H. V. Seshadri. "There is not an inch of the soil of India which our forefathers did not once purchase with their blood. We cannot be false to the

blood of our fathers. India, the whole of it, is therefore our heritage and it must be reconquered for Islam. Expansion in the spiritual sense is an inherent necessity of our faith. Our ultimate ideal should be the unification of India, spiritually as well as politically, under the banner of Islam. The final political salvation of India is not otherwise possible" This is the Muslim version of Akhand Bharat!

Has the Jihadi mindset given up its dream of converting India into Dar-ul-Islam? Not at all. The proxy war by Pakistan, countless bomb blasts from Jammu and Kashmir in the north to Mumbai to Coimbatore to Calcutta to Delhi, terrorism in Punjab, North East and demographic aggression by Bangladesh, all indicate a sinister design against India. Jihadi terrorism had a free run in the country throughout the 20th century and continues to do so even now. History of Jihad in India in the 20th century also shows that Indian secularism has not won even a single victory over Islamic fundamentalism right from the days of Khilafat movement (1920) to the 13 December 2001 attack on the Indian Parliament.

Jihad: Doctrine of Permanent War and Indian Secularism

Islam has six pillars to stand on. These are :-

- (a) Open profession of faith that there is no god but God and Muhammad is the messenger of God and that he is last of the prophets.
- (b) Five prayers a day to be said at dawn, noon, mid-afternoon, sunset and nightfall.
- (c) Alms-giving.

- (d) Fasting.
- (e) Pilgrimage to Mecca (Haj).
- (f) Jihad.

The first five relate to individuals and the last one is the concern and duty of the entire Muslim Umma (community). While the first five tenets of Islam are positive and entirely beneficial in an individual's life, it is the last one, the Jihad, which is dreaded by the world community because of its insensate and never ending violence which has theological sanction. Jihad is the short form of full Quranic expression *Jihad fi Salilillah* (i.e. Jihad in the way of Allah). So whenever Jihad is declared it must be understood to have been ordained by God and this provides the strongest motivating force.

Since Jihad is a vast subject and any scholastic study is out of the purview of this paper, it would suffice to mention five well-recognised and accepted components of this all-important part of Islam. Jihad stands for :-

- (a) Forcible expansion of Islam.
- (b) Destruction of infidels.
- (c) Establishment of Jizya on the subdued infidel population.
- (e) Plunder, in the form of properties wrested from infidels; and
- (f) Plunder, in the form of enslaved female and children population acquired from the vanquished infidels.

The question that arises is whether there could be Islam without Jihad? The

answer is yes. The components of Jihad, as explained above, would help one understand why Jihadis are so terribly cruel to their victims. Whether it were the Hindu victims of Jihadi Moplas (1921) or Hindu and Sikh victims of Jihadis in Pakistan in 1947 or killing of minorities in East Pakistan / Bangladesh by slow hemorrhage, the pattern of gruesome bloodshed and extermination of Kafirs is the same. Jihad is a terrible machine of tyranny and merciless bloodshed to advance the cause of Islam. The entire history of Islam in India is truly the history of Jihad and no wonder Jihadis today are such a malevolent force to reckon with. For the continuous and never ending bloodshed, the responsibility lies not so much on the Jihadis as on the shoulders of the so called secular leadership of the nation. A careful study of the history of Hindu Muslim relationship, since day one of the last century till today, would show the utter ineptness with which the secular leadership tried to tackle this problem. The Jihadis were pampered all along, which whetted their hunger for more and more space. This resulted in the classic statement made by Suhrawardy, a leader of the Muslim League that Pakistan was their latest but not the last demand. Jihadis, thus walked away with every murder. The secular forces never considered confronting the Jihadis ideologically, and this was their single most important failure. Unless the Jihadis are confronted ideologically, in addition to meeting their challenge with a bomb for a bullet, blood of innocent people will continue to be shed and flow to the everlasting shame of the Indian state. But how to mount an ideological war against the Jihadis? This needs a little elaboration. Among some of the important components of Islam and the Islamic way of life are the system of slaves and slavery, interest free loan, concubinage, Hijrat and Islamic penal system. The Muslim had

perforce to discard all these elements without anyone realising it. If all these components of Islam have disappeared, why not Jihad? Let us consider only one aspect of Hijrat. According to the Quranic / Islamic ethos, Muslims are not supposed to live in a country which is Dar-ul-Harb and they are supposed to perform Hijrat, leave the country and migrate to Dar-ul-Islam. (Hijrat was once resorted to by a very large number of Indian Muslims under the advice and guidance of Maulana Abul Kalam Azad in 1919. The Muslims wanted to migrate to Afghanistan but found the borders closed. All these migrants returned to their homes in utter destitution. This was the only Hijrat ever performed by the Indian Muslims and was a miserable failure). If the Muslims can jettison the above mentioned components of Islam, then why not discard Jihad also. The Jihadis in India are committing another sin. They are not only not performing the sacred duty of Hijrat, millions of Jihadis are infiltrating from Bangladesh to settle down in India. Or is it their endeavour to convert India which is a Dar-ul-Harb at present into Dar-ul-Islam? Either way, it has been an egregious failure on the part of the secular forces to grasp the significance and need for confronting the Jihadis ideologically. Unless we do so, we will continue to be bled by the Jihadis with every possibility of India being handed over to Islam on a platter. The danger is very real. The secular forces must stop mollycoddling the Jihadis, call them to account and halt them in their tracks. Gandhi failed miserably against Jihadis and Jawahar Lal Nehru too did not succeed with Jihadi mentality (remember how Sheikh Abdulla stabbed him in the back). The present day secular leadership, following in the footsteps of Mahatma Gandhi and Nehru will never, repeat never, succeed. Despite Gandhi,

Jihadis walked away with 1/4th of India in 1947. Despite Jawahar Lal Nehru, Sheikh Abdulla had his way. Despite secular leadership, Kashmiri Pandits have been "ethnically cleansed". Despite the concept of Hijrat, 40 million Jihadis have entered India illegally from Bangladesh and settled here. Is India on the way to becoming a Dar-ul-Islam? The answer is in the affirmative and in that is the real danger facing India. India faces the danger of becoming a part of Islamic estate of Wahabbis whose basic principle is the notion that "Islam thrives on hostility towards infidels". Here a word about Hindu fundamentalism is called for. Of late, there has been phenomenal rise in the graph of Hindu fundamentalism which culminated in the demolition of the Babri Masjid in 1992. The rise of Hindu fundamentalism is a reaction to Islamic fundamentalism but it does not enjoy the kind of universal support and sympathy as the Jihadis do. Furthermore, Hindu fundamentalism cannot be the exact counterpart of Jihad because it does not have scriptural backing and operates on an ad hoc basis alone. It is not a permanent doctrine of war or an inseparable part of Hinduism, as in the case of Jihad, which is synonymous with Islam. Hindu fundamentalism just cannot sustain itself over a long period of time and as such is no match for Islamic fundamentalism. So far as India's secularism is concerned, it has always been worsted by Islamic fundamentalism. It has never won any victory. It has been receiving thorough drubbing at the hands of Islamic fundamentalists in areas where Muslims are in majority. Its acceptance by Muslims in areas where they are in minority is entirely tactical and not genuine. In the long run Islamic fundamentalism will clearly win the day because of the growing number of Jihadis and their never ending Jihadi violence.

The Menace of Madrassas - Nurseries of Terrorism

The Partition was no solution to the Hindu-Muslim problem. Besides numerous Indo-Pak problems and never ending confrontation, including extreme rivalry and hostility on the playing fields of cricket and hockey, for which there appears to be no ostensible solution, the biggest problem that afflicted India after 1947 was the presence of a sullen Muslim minority left behind in India, whose numerical strength became a daunting factor in many ways. The founding fathers of the Constitution of India, in their wisdom, wrote Article 30 as one of the fundamental rights which made any interference by the executive or even the courts, in the internal affairs of the educational institutions of the minority communities well nigh impossible. This Article, as experience of the last 50 years has shown, had most deleterious effect not only on the Muslims but also the entire political spectrum of the country, and nowhere it is more visible and palpable than in the historic system of Madrassa education among the Muslims. Historically, Madrassas had played an important role in the field of education, which was heavily theological in content and Arabic language, but now totally out of synch with the spirit of modern times.

Are the graduates from the thousands of Madrassas fit for any useful economic activity? Can they face the challenges of life? As far as meeting the challenges of modern times are concerned these Madrassas have made absolutely no contribution. Even the bigger and well known Madrassas, like Dar-ul-ulum Deoband, Nadwat-ul-Ulema Lucknow, Madarasa-i-Aliya Kolkata, Madras-i-Aliya Rampur and Shamsh-ul-Huda Patna, have made no contribution at all. Their only

contribution has been to successfully seal the minds of the students.

No account of the Madrasa education would be complete without a reference to the efforts of governments of Bengal and Bihar to modify the syllabus of Madrasas. The efforts of the Marxist government of Bengal - an ultra secular government - have met with unprecedented resistance from the Muslims of district Murshidabad, which is a Muslim majority district. Since the Muslims were not happy with the dilution of Islamic content in the syllabus of government run Madrasas, they set up a society known as 'Barua Rahmani' which has set up 109 Madrasas in various parts of the state. In these Madrasas, stress is entirely on religion and Arabic texts and learning Koran by heart. The quality of education and brainwashing of the students may be seen from the following being taught in these Madrasas. In one of the primers teaching Bengali alphabet letters 'dh' stands for Dhol and the sentence to describe it is "Dhol tabla-e Khodar lanat" meaning "Gods curse be on music". It is indeed shocking. The teaching in these Madrasas is entirely Aurangzabian. At a senior level school, the economics textbook teaches that the chief source of national income is expropriating property of vanquished enemy. Is this teaching responsible for expropriating the property and wealth of millions of Hindus and Sikhs in Pakistan and Bangladesh?

This is the quality of Islamic education imparted in thousands of Madrasas. How can anyone expect a decent, cultured human being to emerge from such institutions? When Mr. Buddhdev Bhattacharya, the Marxist Chief Minister of Bengal criticised some of the Madrasas for teaching only theology and

Arabic language he was denounced and roundly criticised by not only the Muslims of West Bengal but members of his own party, to whom party interests are more important than the national interest. The Hon'ble Chief Minister had to recant his statement. The society, Barua Rahmani, can continue to teach whatever it likes and produce terrorists. Article 30 is always there to protect them against any interference by the government. This article has proved to be not only of no benefit to the Muslims but also has gone a long way in strengthening the forces of Islamic fundamentalism. This has been a real tragedy.

Conclusion

Time and tide wait for no one. In the foregoing narration, emphasis has been laid on two aspects of present day India. These are the twin monsters of exploding population in India, Pakistan and Bangladesh and the

inexorable march of Islamic fundamentalism. The exploding population is pushing India towards an economic disaster, particularly in the rural areas where people in many parts of the country live under sub-human conditions. Similarly, Islamic fundamentalism and Jihadi violence is pushing the subcontinent towards an Armageddon. Let there be no doubt about these realities. Growth of population must be checked and infiltration of Bangladeshis must be stopped. We have our obligation only towards our own citizens and not Bangladeshi infiltrators. Unless we do so on a war footing, India and its vast majority of people will have nothing to look forward to except live under conditions of extreme poverty and despondence. At the same time, Islamic fundamentalism must be crushed and given ideological fight, which alone will purge it of its murderous proclivities, impurities and sediments. And finally, Indian secularism must be given a spine and rid of its passivity.

DISCUSSIONS

Brigadier S C Sharma

Why is it that the internal challenges, particularly of the demographic explosion, are well understood? India, being in fact an experiment in creation of a pluralistic society, will have to live with such challenges. In this context, it can be said that any consideration of suggestion to trifurcate Jammu and Kashmir would be nothing but falling into a trap laid by the extremists. Fundamentalism should not put us to despair. Fifty years of independent existence is a small period indeed to develop. And, political Islam undoubtedly poses a very big challenge. What we have not referred to is terrorism. The strategy to control terrorism may need to be re-assessed, keeping in mind the need to keep intact the pluralistic character of our country. It has been pointed out that the government schools in Kashmir teach separatism to their children right from the beginning. The syllabi of such schools need to be strictly controlled.

Nehru's observations in 1939 that India geographically was a country designed to be a unified entity was referred to by one of the panelists. India will have to reach a state of equilibrium in the shortest possible time. Any policy that is detailed should work with the objective of developing the entire region as one entity.

Brigadier L S Dhaliwal

There is a problem concerning education for one and all. An educated youth may not wish to undertake farming as he is not trained for it. The other dilemma is regarding the case of Bangladesh. India surrounds it on its three sides and it is bordered by water on the fourth. Barbed wire would not be a cost-effective solution. Then,

there is the question of absorbing terrorist attacks and not responding adequately to them. India is also facing the challenge of caste war. This is a threat of major proportion which needs to be gone into. Then, there are the neglected areas of Orissa, Madhya Pradesh and Rajasthan, where soldiers who are being recruited now may enact in five years time what their predecessors did in Assam, Mizoram and Nagaland. Further, every party is creating a private army of its own. No action is being taken to exercise control on such moves.

Much of the discontentment in the country can also be traced to social and economic disparities. In most cases, a certain amount of autonomy has proved useful in sorting out problems. Mizoram is an example. The answer to most of the ills lies in the economic factor. The bureaucrats and the leadership need to relate themselves to the people. Success is sure when there is an understanding between the masses and the government concerned.

At independence, India was leading Asia; today we are lagging behind many of the Asian countries. The cause lies in the importance attached to the factor of education and medicine. A healthy person makes for a healthy country, with the additive of learning. India's democracy should be a 'controlled' democracy as in China. The military strength comes after attainment of economic power. For this, it is a must that governance of the country must lie with the educated lot.

Colonel S R Lamba

Who will tell the politicians where they go wrong? Either we get some responsible politicians to attend such seminars and go back to educate the politicians or we get the

right people from the media to ensure that the right things are conveyed through their medium. Colonel PK Vasudeva, in his presentation, has rightly mentioned the aspects about Pakistan's nuclear war management and preparedness in foreign policy. India is yet to take these things seriously.

Shri Satya Ray

Most of the literature available on security has been from the military point of view. There is a welcome shift of late to study of national security from political, military, social and economic angles and so on. The security of states is mutually interdependent. India's security should not be seen from the Indo-centric point of view but from a regional perspective. And, suspicion can not be the foundation of this study.

General S S Brar

My query is related to the well being of the Armed Forces because they face internal and external challenges to the country's security. Their needs get neglected. Why is it that they are unable to get the government to accept some of the measures or proposals that they come up with, to keep pace at least with the other services in the country.

Lieutenant General Vijay Oberoi

It is a fact that all these issues that are bothersome cannot be traced to the senior hierarchy of the Armed Forces. To attribute non-action is incorrect. Action by the senior hierarchy has always been taken. Regarding the matter of having a politician present at seminars, ministries' representatives were present. One of the failings of the officer cadre of the Armed Forces is our training and our ethos. It is our strength and our ethos that has made us perform so well. As

to the dilemma why the politicians and the bureaucrats do not respond, the answer lies in the fact that the Indian Armed Forces have not learnt to say 'no' to demands placed on them. Hence, it is expected from the Indian Armed Forces that they do anything that is tasked of them. The Armed Forces must know how to say the word 'no' also, or else their professionalism is likely to deteriorate. The Services have to serve the nation while simultaneously making attempts to improve professionally.

Colonel Pritam Bhullar

History has made the Army the way they are - they cannot say 'no' to any task. Loyalty and discipline are of prime imperative to the Army. Though the Army has come out of the British mould, they still lack the experience in dealing with the bureaucrats and the politicians. A question was raised on what could be done about the deployment of the Army on the borders at the behest of the government. The reply is that nothing can be done. The Army can only obey. What the Army can perhaps do is convince them eventually on what would be right.

Brigadier J S Phulka

Mis-governance is our major undoing. And we do not have an answer to this as yet. Lord Macaulay in his book *Administrations of the World*, written in the 1890s, concludes in his study of five countries that, in any country where there was corruption in administration, there was progress. But wherever the rulers were corrupt, the country would face deterioration.

Lieutenant General B K N Chibber

Reference has been made to Nepal, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka. Ironically the discussions have been predominantly Pakistan and Kashmir-centric. The Army is deployed along the borders in Jammu and

Kashmir and on the Western front and in the North East. Contingencies may arise in other areas also. This would require increase in the strength of the Army by at least 50 per cent, keeping in view the increase in problems in this country.

Lieutenant Colonel P N Bahri

Terrorism is a battle of minds, which is yet to be recognised. Religion, will all due apologies seems to be the biggest enemy of society. Mr Ashok Singhal has warned that there could be a 'Gujarat' all over India. Can this sort of mindset, carried over the years, change? May be, religion should be made voluntary and by choice.

Colonel J M S Hatter

The problem that confronts us is one of deprivation, which is a result of the burgeoning population. Related to this population problem is the problem of religion. There is a conflict between Islam and Christianity. There are instances of this in Philippines, Indonesia, former Yugoslavia and so on. In India, at the time of Partition, Punjab had no Muslims except in the area of Maler Kotla, now there are roughly 30 lac Muslims in Punjab.

Chairman's Remarks

India's internal threats are non-military in nature. Security is contingent on institutional stability, social cohesion, good governance, and a growth of six to seven per cent every year. In a democracy like ours, where there is ethnic diversity and heterogeneity, people's aspirations will always be at cross-purposes. This is bound to lead to a sense of alienation and instability. These are factors that must be addressed by the decision makers. The foundations of national security will ultimately depend upon

strengthening the state to make it more effective and responsive to challenges. Over-centralisation of state powers perhaps made sense when command planning was there. In a market economy, this would be counter-productive. The government will need to strike a balance between command economy and private enterprise. Non traditional security issues are gaining importance everywhere. Perhaps, not so much in India. India's credibility as a regional power will be contingent on its military strength, including nuclear deterrence policy. Contrary to what has been expressed by some in this Seminar, in my opinion, although the structure of India's Armed Forces is designed to fight inter-state wars, the Indian Army has been involved with intra-state conflicts. It has been fighting insurgencies and terrorism and secessionist movements over the last fifty years. This is a trend that has increased over the years. Such a prolonged and large-scale employment of the Army on internal security duties has lowered its combat potential. The nation has to ensure that the commitment of the Army to meet internal threats must be drastically reduced. A good model option is provided in the employment of Rashtriya Rifles. An internal security force that we create or modify must be led, trained and have the ethos of the Army. Only then can it function. I agree with the opinion expressed here at the Seminar by some that the BSF, the CRPF, and the CPOs as they exist today are unable to meet this requirement.

India can never go it alone. Neighbours matter. A credible regional framework is, therefore, vital. Regional security must be based on co-operative security for national development by respective countries. Overlapping threats have to be approached in this manner especially rather than in an antagonistic manner.

INTRODUCTORY REMARKS

LIEUTENANT GENERAL VIJAY OBEROI, PVSM, AVSM, VSM (RETD)

I welcome Lieutenant General SS Mehta, PVSM, AVSM and Bar, VSM, GOC-in-C Western Command. In his nearly forty years of service, Lieutenant General SS Mehta has held a string of practically all high grade appointments. I have had the occasion to serve with him at many places, including the Military Operations Directorate when I was the DGMO and he was my highly competent Additional DG. Prior to assuming

command of the prestigious Western Command, he had commanded the ARTRAC at Shimla. As a person who has commanded both these versatile commands, I know how busy he is and has been. He was the Army's representative in the high powered task force on the Review of Management of Defence, which was later approved by the Government and is in the process of implementation. I now request him to deliver the Valedictory Address.

VALEDICTORY ADDRESS

**LIEUTENANT GENERAL SS MEHTA, PVSM, AVSM AND BAR, VSM
GOC-in-C Western Command**

I am honoured by the invitation to give the valedictory address to this distinguished gathering. Kautilya's Arthashastra has mentioned the four types of threats which can besiege a nation. These are, an external threat - externally abetted, an external threat - internally abetted, an internal threat - externally abetted and an internal threat - internally abetted. We face all these threats in some form or the other. It is through forums like this that we exploit our intellectual capacity to evaluate the scenarios of each threat, to enable ourselves to come up with workable strategies. The challenge to defend our citizens, our interests and our values, must remain paramount in all our considerations. Henry Kissinger had observed that "Morality without security is ineffectual, and security without morality is empty". To establish the relationship and preparation between these two goals is perhaps the most profound challenge facing us.

Often there is a debate whether interests and values can ever be defended by forceful means? John Stuart Mill had this to say: "War is an ugly thing, but not the ugliest of things. Those who think that nothing is worth a war, is worse. ...A man who has nothing which he cares about more than he does about, his personal safety, is a miserable creature who has no chance of being free, unless made and kept so by the exertions of better men than himself." Ironically, new and elusive challenges have proliferated. The good news is that, in part, this has happened because of our success in deterring nuclear and conventional wars. Our neighbour is aware that it cannot prevail

against us in either type of war; the 1965 and more importantly the 1971 War, what with 90,000 prisoners of war, rankles her psyche. So they have turned to other methods. They hope that proxy war will ensnare us in our scruples and exploit our humane inhibitions against applying force to defend our interests.

In the current context cross border terrorism is the most striking form of proxy war. To quote George Shultz : "Terrorist acts are a form of criminality, waged by surprise attack against unarmed men, women and children in cold blood. Terrorist attacks are sometimes the random, senseless acts of zealots; most often they are systematic and calculated attempts to achieve political ends. Despite the horror they inflict and the widespread recognition that their acts are criminal, few terrorists get caught, and fewer still are punished to the full extent they deserve. They know we abhor the loss of innocent lives; so they hide and train in their midst. Propagators of proxy war sometimes do not realise that it is easier to compound it – than to end it.

We often debate amongst ourselves over the appropriate targets or the foreign policy consequences of a punitive blow. While we are right in being careful to unsheathe our sword, prudence demands that we remain ready and razor sharp for any eventuality. The line between peace and war is less clearly drawn now than at any time in history. Yet convinced of the precious worth of freedom we enjoy, due to our secular and democratic tradition, we seek to avoid conflict.

We have a history and tradition of giving a long rope, but we remain conscious of the need to remain prepared with assured delivery when, and if, called upon to do so. Contemporary challenges created by half-hidden hostile acts have become so blurred that we can no more confidently predict the occurrence of an aggression. We must, thus, be prepared for any eventuality, at any moment, ranging in intensity - from terrorist isolated acts to higher levels of confrontation.

In the interregnum, there is a compelling need to probe deeper into the problem and contribute to public knowledge and education. Such scenarios are vehicles for such debate. Today we are much advanced as a nation in

this regard than we were a few years ago. We owe to the Media - both electronic and print - for this; their interest in matters of national security is welcome. Public discussion and debate about the problems and challenges to national security must continue - not to magnify our hesitations but to crystallise a national consensus. With the necessary will, hard work and wisdom, we will prevail over the challenge, as we have prevailed on countless occasions in our proud history.

I wish to applaud Lieutenant General Vijay Oberoi for the initiative for filling the vacuum on security debate in Chàndigarh. Western Command is committed to providing whatever little help we can in this regard.

VOTE OF THANKS

LIEUTENANT GENERAL VIJAY OBEROI, PVSM, AVSM, VSM (RETD)

I thank Lieutenant General SS Mehta for sparing the time to come and deliver the Valedictory Address, which needless to say was packed with a host of extremely important issues in the brief time available. What you have stated will be taken note of by the community the USI represents and by the guests present here. I would be failing in my duty if I do not thank General V P Malik former Chief of the Army Staff for chairing the first session. We did miss Shri A N Mathur, Chief Secretary of the Government of Haryana, who could not attend the Seminar due to official engagements.

I would also like to thank the participants of both sessions for their excellent presentations and the trouble they took to put the papers together. I would also like to thank all the members and guests for their attendance and active participation in this Seminar. In the final analysis, the success of this Seminar can be directly attributed to the USI members at Chandigarh and our distinguished guests who have taken time to attend the Seminar and displayed interest.

I also thank the Director of the USI and the Council Members, especially Lieutenant General R S Dayal, PVSM, MVC (Retd) for their encouragement and support in putting this Seminar together. Putting together, co-ordinating and tying up all the administrative

details could only be achieved by the active support which Headquarters Western Command provided. Despite their pre-occupation with current operational commitments, they met all my requirements. My grateful acknowledgement to the Army Commander and the Staff of Headquarters Western Command for their complete support, so generously given. I would also like to thank Major General Sadananda, Commandant of the Command Hospital not only for permitting us the use of this fine auditorium, but also for their administrative support. Thanks are also due to Brigadier SC Sharma, Commander 12 Signal Group and his officers and men, for cheerfully meeting all the demands placed on them. I thank Major John Prince of 12 Signal Group and Major DS Kundu of Command Hospital and the JCOS and NCOs assisting them for their untiring efforts in meeting all the administrative requirements.

This Seminar should be considered as a starting point for conducting similar intellectually stimulating events under the aegis of the USI as also for lobbying for the establishment of a structured organisation based in Chandigarh or Panchkula. This may take time, but a beginning has to be made. It is only then that one could adopt a focused approach to many issues of national and regional interest.